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Abstract – The rise of post-national entities, such as the institutions of the European
Union and of free-trade regimes, bears no obvious relation to the traditional pillars of
western private law (mostly contracts, torts, and property doctrines). The claim of this
article is that the global diffusion of private law discourse contributes significantly to the
emergence of new centers of authority in the global arena. The article tests the impact of
private law arguments in three contexts – the growing legitimacy of regional human
rights adjudication, the consolidation of the institutions of the European Union, and the
higher binding force of international investment treaties. Private law gains popularity in
global legal discourse when its most centrifugal features are emphasized (individual
autonomy, horizontal dispersion of authority, indifference to governmental institutions).
Once popular, however, private law discourse also evokes centripetal arguments
(aspiration to internal coherence, uniformity in adjudication) and therefore paves the way
to new centers of public, vertical power. Most noticeably, private law discourse provides
regional or global institutions with a patina of distributive neutrality, and therefore
facilitates the endorsement of ideologically laden institutional developments.
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INTRODUCTION

2

The current world order is characterized by an intricate mix of cross-border
dealings between individuals and/or public entities.1 The sovereign nation state, as we
have come to know it for over three centuries, is not necessarily central to this picture.2
Many transactions take place within loose regulatory schemes provided by international
networks of public agencies,3 or by horizontal clusters of transnational market actors.4 In
this context, private law is a central subject in globalization discourse, and contributes in
many ways to the decline of the state.5 Private law performs a significant state-breaking
1

PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956) still offers a most interesting description and prediction of

these phenomena. See Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Jan
Smits ed., 2006) (forthcoming, p. 4 of manuscript on file).
2

The relation between the expansion of the role of private actors in public international law and the erosion

of sovereignty is now the subject of intense academic debate. See e.g. Duncan B. Hollis, Private Actors in
Public International Law: Amicus Curiae and the Case for the Retention of State Sovereignty, 25 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 235 (2002), especially at 235-236.
3
4

See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (Princeton UP, 2004).
Network theory postulates that private legal orders generate new regulatory dynamics in a global

economy, where spontaneous law-making replaces state-based hierarchies of norms. See Gunther Teubner,
‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE, 3 (Gunther
Teubner ed., Dartmouth 1997). Teubner’s now classic work brings the independence of private
transnational interactions to the level of axiom. The author identifies a number of different systems, such as
the worlds of lex sportiva or lex constructionis, capable of producing real and effective norms of conduct
for discrete economic or associational purposes, without the assistance of state-based law-making
institutions. See Id. at 4 (pointing at “ a new body of law that emerges from various globalization processes
in multiple sectors of civil society independently of the laws of the nation-states.” See also Sol Picciotto,
Introduction: Reconceptualizing Regulation in the Era of Globalization, in NEW DIRECTIONS

IN

REGULATORY THEORY 1-11 (Sol Picciotto & David Campbell eds., Blackwell, Oxford, 2002).
5

Torts, property, and contracts rules – traditional pillars of private law systems in the western world - are at

the core of transnational disputes between individual litigants. Through conflicts-of-law mechanisms,
states’ courts must make room now more than ever for rules originating outside of their jurisdiction. For
critical insights on this point see Ralf Michaels, Globalizing Savigny? The State in Savigny’s Private
International Law, and the Challenge of Europeanization and Globalization, Duke Law School Legal

3

function. It de-emphasizes the ‘vertical’ subordination of citizens to their sovereigns, and
points at ‘horizontal’ relations between equally situated market actors.
At the opposite end of the globalization picture, one encounters a different
phenomenon – one of consolidation of sovereignty around new centers of institutional
power, such as the European Union (EU), regional human rights courts, or the institutions
of world trade.6 These post-national institutions differ profoundly from national
governments and need not even be identified by geographical borders. Yet there is no
doubt that such institutions constrain the political will of state sovereigns.7 They are fully
recognized by the international legal community and endowed with regulatory and/or
Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 74 (2005). Secondly, the diffusion of private arbitration
decreases the role of state-based institutions in matters of adjudication. See infra __ Part II.iv. Lastly, a lot
of law-making now stems from networks of economic operators acting independently of official
governments. See Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra__.
6

The age of globalization is witnessing many instances of this phenomenon. The switch is from a stage in

which the fortunes of the Dutch Guilder were only de facto dependent upon the stability of the German
Mark, to a stage in which the European Central Bank in Frankfurt dictates the interest rates applicable in
the Netherlands (and in the rest of the Euro area); from a stage in which a country spontaneously improved
its internal human rights regime because, if it did not, its trade relations with neighboring states would
suffer, to a stage in which individuals can actually sue that country and have it pay compensation whenever
it fails to comply with a human rights charter developed by neighboring states; from a stage in which
treating foreign investors fairly was merely in the economic interest of the host state, to a stage in which
mistreating foreign investors actually leads to enforceable sanctions. These are all forms of regional or
global integration implemented by the creation of new institutions, and by legal – as opposed to social,
political and economic – tools. See Kal Raustiala, Book Review of ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY
DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM (2004), 55:3 J. LEGAL ED. [page 2 of
http://ssrn.com/abstract=880798] (2005) (noting that "The number of such institutions rose dramatically in
the postwar era, and their ambit is wide.")
7

See SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER, supra__ at 144-145 (distinguishing between horizontal and

vertical networks of global or regional government, and explaining that in the case of vertically integrated
networks, such as the EU and the WTO, governments have chosen to delegate some functions to
independents organization endowed with real sovereignty, whereby “supranational officials can harness the
coercive powers of national officials.”)
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adjudicatory functions once reserved solely to states.8 In such cases, sovereignty sheds
the appearance of horizontal dispersion. Its many pieces, disassembled by globalizing
forces, coalesce around public, official, vertical power structures.9
In this part of the globalization picture, traditional private law –understood as a
coherent set of rules for the adjudication of contracts, torts and property disputes – is by
no means prominent. The re-definition of state sovereignty resulting from the legal
growth of numerous free trade areas and regional human rights regimes is mostly studied
as a subject of political theory10 and constitutional or international law.11
Against the background of such common understandings, this article aims at
highlighting the yet insufficiently explored connection between (old) private law and
(new) post-national sovereignty. The claim is that, for better or worse, traditional private8

Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication,

107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997).
9

In the aftermath of World War II, two ideological strands fueled this institutional development - the

economic logic of free trade, and an international convergence on the values of human dignity. Ricardo’s
theory of comparative advantage became the center-piece of a grand vision which associated long-lasting
peace with economic interdependence between sovereign nations. The proliferation of free trade areas and
other forms of regional economic integration in the past 50 years can only be explained by the popularity of
that vision. For a recent analysis of this development see Ari Afilalo & Dennis Patterson, Statecraft, Trade
and the Order of States, __CHI. J. INT’L L. 2005 [Manuscript on file, p. 18]. At the same time, the horrors
of the war generated a broad based consensus on the need to create supra-national control mechanisms,
capable of bringing states to compliance with what was hoped were universal values of human dignity. (For
the important qualification that "consensus" was formed without the direct participation of colonized world
leadership see Beth Lyon, Discourse in Development: A Post-Colonial "Agenda" for the United Nations
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 535, 538, fn 5
(2002)). Both free-trade logic and universalism in human rights provided the ideological momentum for
progressive cessions of sovereignty, and at times prompted the creation of new centers of governance in
post-national settings.
10

For a recent and helpful review of this literature see Afilalo & Patterson, supra __.

11

See Chantal Thomas, Constitutional Change and International Government, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2000).
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law discourse facilitates the emergence of new forms of institutional sovereignty in the
age of globalization. The point of these pages is to illustrate how and why this is the case.
The process of reassembling vertical power within new post-national institutions
is hereby termed ‘State-making’ for the purpose of evoking historical precedents.12
The rhetoric of private law was notoriously relevant to the construction of
European nations in the 18th and 19th centuries.

(At least according to popular

iconography, the Code civil was an essential component of Napoleon’s state-making
agenda.13) Today, private law discourse fulfills the analogous task of consolidating postnational authorities and supranational forms of government. These powerful, yet underdefined, institutions lack such traditional sources of legitimacy as representative
democracy and broad-based accountability. Their authority is still fragile, improbable,
and often politically contested.14 In this context, private law performs badly needed
justificatory functions, and bolsters the institutional strength of such entities.
12

Post-national institutions are usually not referred to as “States” because of the many differences between

traditional state sovereignty and post-national governance. The traditional state, territorially confined and
monopolistically endowed with all functions of government at once, bears little resemblance with the multilevel governance models embodied in such entities as the EU or regional human rights courts. See,
however, VIVIEN A. SCHMIDT, DEMOCRACY

IN

EUROPE: THE EU

AND

NATIONAL POLITIES, Chapter 1

(OUP, forthcoming 2006, manuscript on file) (acknowledging the profound transformation of Westphalian
sovereignty in the age of globalization, and yet 'stretching' the concept of the State to encompass post- and
supra-national institutions with real coercive powers such as the EU.) Throughout the article, I shall use the
word “State” with a capital S when referring to post-national institutions. A lower case initial indicates,
instead, sovereign states as traditionally understood in modern international law.
13
14

See infra Part I.iii.
SLAUGHTER, supra __ 219-221 (reviewing the charges of unaccountability moved against global

government networks); ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION
THROUGH LAW REFORM 81 (NYUP 2004) (lamenting the loss of participatory democracy that stems from
the super-power of states' executive branches at the international level). Cf. Andrew Moravcsik, Is There a
Democratic Deficit in World Politics? 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 336 (2004) (arguing, by contrast, that if

6

This happens because in global legal discourse, more often and forcefully than in
domestic settings, the label of private law is still associated with the highly formalist
rhetoric of classical legal thought, capable of drawing seemingly firm boundaries
between public and private domains, or between multiple spheres of private power.15
Authority feeds on legitimacy, and legitimacy thrives on the apparent clarity of
boundaries. In the context of post-national institutions, private law seems still capable of
defining the limits of authority, and therefore shelters authority from challenge. Its Statemaking power is today less obvious, but no less effective than it ever was.16

properly understood, democratic deficits do not really exist in global governance.) For sector-specific
analysis of democratic deficits see Stephen C. Sieberson, The Proposed European Union Constitution. Will
It Eliminate the EU's Democratic Deficit? 10 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 173 (2004) (surveying the literature on the
EU’s alleged democratic deficit); Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1, 6 (2005) (“the WTO suffers from a lack of popular support, loyalty, and input legitimacy…”); and
Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra __ at 19 (noting, in the context of transnational arbitration, that “[L]ack
of institutional autonomy makes [lex mercatoria] vulnerable to political pressures for its …
‘legitimation.’”)
15

See Daniela Caruso, Private Law and Public Stakes in European Integration: The Case of Property, 10

EUR.L.J. 751 (2004) (showing, tin the context of European integration, that private/public boundaries may
shift from time to time, depending on strategies and circumstances, but that the very possibility of linedrawing is unmistakably at the core of transnational private law discourse.) Private law categories have
helped to consolidate public sovereignty on both sides of the Atlantic. In the US, the clear-cut partitions of
private law provided the federal architecture with convenient metaphors. After the Civil War, “the use of
the common law rules to provide a meaning for concepts like property, liberty, contract, and so forth,
reinforced the judges’ claim to a neutral, apolitical method of public law adjudication.” DUNCAN KENNEDY,
THE RISE & FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 266 (Cambridge: AFAR 1998).
16

Like nationalism, private law discourse comes in two varieties – state-breaking and state-making. See

Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism, 1 YEARBOOK EUR.
L. 268 (1981) (explaining that nationalist sentiments can operate both centrifugally (when ethnic minorities
rebel against incumbent powers to reclaim self-governance) and centripetally (when new nation-states are
built upon a Bismarckian emphasis on common ‘volkish’ roots). See also Nathaniel Berman, “But the
Alternative Is Despair”: European Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law, 106

7

This article offers a counterpoint to a conspicuous strand of contemporary legal
discourse, intensely preoccupied with the state-breaking function of private law and
obsessed with issues of spontaneity, horizontality, and dialogue in norm production.17 An
excessive emphasis on these traits unduly reinforces the perception of private law’s
autonomy from constituted powers, and downplays private law’s predictable rise to
systemic dimensions. The result is a chronic underestimation of the role of private law
arguments in bringing to life new systems, and – for better or worse – new institutional
hierarchies in a post-national landscape.

Part I recounts how classical private law features prominently in the legal history
of the entire western world. Historical and structural differences notwithstanding, both
common- and civil-law systems at some point generated the idea of a self-contained body
of rules, meant to guarantee the smooth running of horizontal relations between equally
situated subjects. This idealized system stood in contrast with other sets of rules and
principles meant to regulate the exercise of discretionary authority in ‘vertical’ relations
between states and subjects. Indifferent to power, technical, and therefore utterly nonpolitical, this distinctively ‘private’ mode of legal discourse still enjoys much currency.
Part I proceeds to identify two discursive strands within this form of private law
discourse – one pointing at private autonomy and dispersion, the other infused with
systemic traits and usually associated with centralized authority. The two strands can be
conceptualized as two sides of the same coin, necessarily related and inseparable. The

HARV. L. REV. 1792, 1803 (1993) (portraying nationalism in interwar European discourse as both an agent
of devastation and a potentially stabilizing foundation of new legal systems.)
17

See infra, Part I.iv.
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analysis is meant to show how quickly the coin can be flipped, and how conveniently the
state-breaking rhetoric of one side can feed into the State-making logic of the other.

Part II provides three examples of this phenomenon, arranged in ascending order
of impact: (1) The private property paradigm has recently led to the enforcement of
international human rights law even in areas characterized by otherwise intractable
political impasses; (2) EU courts and institutions are increasingly invoking private law in
order to consolidate and legitimize the institutional gains of European integration; (3)
Contracts doctrines are assuming new prominence in both private and public international
law, lending legitimacy and credibility to the politically vulnerable institutions of free
trade.

In light of these examples, Part III analyzes a number of classical private law
images, structures and discursive associations that facilitate the conversion of diffuse
powers into new institutional hierarchies. Historically rooted upon natural law, privatelaw rights are endowed with absolute rhetorical strength and independent of positivist
justification. If based on jus-natural private-law logic, radical institutional developments
may gain the appearance of legal necessity. Secondly, private law’s celebration of
individual autonomy does not necessarily lead to dispersion. It can also lend support to
centralized institutions, portrayed as necessary to ensure the uniform and predictable
enforcement of individual promises. Private law’s endemic aspiration to internal
coherence often justifies the emergence of centralized institutions, invested with tasks of
legal harmonization. Lastly, the triumph of distributive neutrality – a typical feature of

9

classical private law rhetoric – may lend post-national authorities the appearance of
necessity and legitimacy.

Part IV is a final reflection on the normative implications of private law
arguments as currently used in a global landscape. In many ways, private law discourse is
a tool with untapped potential that may point at novel modes of post-national governance.
But at times the power of its rhetoric silences the already feeble voices of democracy in
the context of globalization, where more – not less – voices should be heard.

I. PRIVATE LAW IN TRANSATLANTIC DISCOURSE18

i. Horizontality and neutrality in classical private law. - The discourse at stake in
these pages is the commonality of private-law categories and modules intuitively shared
by lawyers, judges, bureaucrats, and legal scholars in modern western history.19 The
18

As applied in social sciences, “discourse” refers to a unified set of words, symbols and metaphors

corresponding to a given world-view. It is often built upon broad generalizations, and indifferent to detail.
When a mode of discourse establishes itself as the common way of speaking in a given community, it both
reflects and contributes to the reality from which it originates. Discourse generates consensus about basic
conceptual categories, allows debate to occur, and in many ways pre-determines deliberative outcomes. See
Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661, 663 (1989), for the
Foucaultian intuition that ““how we think about law” and “the law we think about” are not really two
different things; definition creates reality as much as it orders it.” See also Vivien A. Schmidt, Values and
Discourse in the Politics of Adjustment, in 1 WELFARE

AND

WORK

IN THE

OPEN ECONOMY: FROM

VULNERABILITY TO COMPETITIVENESS 229 (Fritz W. Scharpf & Vivien A. Schmidt eds., 2000).
19

See Duncan Kennedy, Towards an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness, 3 RES. L. & SOC.

3, 6 (1980) ("[P]eople can have in common something more influential than a checklist of facts, techniques,
and legal opinions. They can share premises about the salient aspects of the legal order that are so basic that

10

community of reference, for the purposes of this essay, is the western legal family,
comprising both civil- and common-law systems, and characterized by a clear distinction
between law on one hand, and politics or religion on the other.20 The kind of private law
that enjoys much currency in global legal discourse is historically based upon a particular
mode of legal thought, conventionally termed “classical.” In this version, private law can
be sketched as follows.
Private law rules apply to horizontal relations between citizens of formally equal
powers (as opposed to relations between citizens and their sovereign)21 and aim at solving
private disputes between two litigants (as opposed to pursuing the common good of a

actors rarely if ever bring them consciously to mind."); and David Kennedy, Challenging Expert Rule: The
Politics of Global Governance, 27 SIDNEY L. REV. 5 (2005).
20

HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW

AND

REVOLUTION. THE FORMATION

OF THE

WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION

(1983). See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's Legal Systems, 45
AM. J. COMP. L. 5, at 23, fn. 62 (1997): “The homogeneity of the western legal tradition is largely due to
two … "great ideological separations": the separation between law and politics and the separation between
law and religious and/or philosophical tradition.” In proposing an alternative to the usual “Euro-American
centric” taxonomy of legal families in comparative law, Mattei concedes that “Western-style rule of law
could be an alternative way” of defining his “rule of professional law.” The dominant status of the western
tradition in global legal relations is in many ways arbitrary, and the product of an intellectual history based
on strategic selection and biased genealogies. See P.G. Monateri, Black Gaius: A Quest for Multicultural
Origins of the "Western Legal Tradition," 51 HASTINGS L.J. 479 (2000). This tradition, however, is
contributing significantly to the growing 'legalization' of transnational interactions.
21

HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 280-281 (Max Knight trans., 2d ed. 1967) (1934) (reporting, with

criticism, that according to a prevalent classification, “private law represents a relationship between
coordinated, legally equal-ranking subjects; public law, a relationship between a super- and a subordinated
subject […]. Private law relationships are called simply “legal relationships” in the narrower sense of the
term, to juxtapose to them the public-law relationships as “power relationships” or relationships of
“dominion.”” Kelsen opposed this traditional dualism, and postulated the identity of state and law. Id. at
318-319.
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given constituency).22

This definition produces a seemingly orderly and predictable

course of adjudicatory practices.

It explains, for instance, that a nuisance dispute

between neighbors concerning the proper use of adjacent properties will be adjudicated
exclusively on the basis of their respective rights, with no regard to public policy
concerns for zoning, urbanization, environment, etc.23 It is also characterized by internal
coherence, meant as the peaceful, analytical coexistence of few conceptual pillars upon
which the entire regulatory design is orderly built.
In the U.S., the legal world-view of Christopher Columbus Langdell is often
characterized as embracing this model with enthusiasm.24 In European legal
historiography, this form of private law discourse is associated with the German

22

Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1313 (2002)

(“Common-law rules and adjudication are structured around discrete transactions between strangers. The
prevailing, classically liberal, model of tort, contract, and property cases features atomistic individuals who
interact only at the point of a discontinuous event, sharply limited in space and time.”) In continental
private law the emphasis on “discrete transactions” is just as strong. See e.g. R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE LAW (Cambridge University Press 1992), Preface to the English
language edition, vii (“Private law is concerned with individual men and women…” (emphasis added.)
23

The introduction of social considerations into the code, such as the weighing of conflicting socio-

industrial interests introduced in the regime of nuisance in the Italian civil code, do not signify opening to
politics, but rather a recommendation to the judge towards the solution of one dispute at the time, between
two private parties at the time. “It is settled case law that [the regime of nuisance in the civil code] on one
hand, and the statutes and regulations governing productive activities or noise limits on the other, pursue
different goals and have different applications. The former relates to private property rights and aims at
balancing the interests of neighboring land owners. The latter pursue public interest goals.” Corte suprema
di Cassazione, Case No. 10735 of August 3, 2001.
http://www.diritto.it/sentenze/magistratord/sent_10735_01.html (my translation).
24

Thomas Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983). GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH

OF

CONTRACT (1974).
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historical school, which systematized the bits and pieces of Roman law as elaborated
through the Middle Ages.25
This model created a watertight separation between private and public law. At the
start of the 20th century, comparative law scholars of the western world could count on
one stable similarity between civil and common-law systems – the private/public
distinction.26 When crossing the Atlantic Ocean or the Channel, jurists from the old
Continent would find comfort in the thought that, at home or abroad, private law was a
distinct set of rules based on individual rights and aimed at settling horizontal disputes,
while public law pertained to sovereign governance in pursuit of collective goals.27 Self-

25

Franz Wieacker explains:

“Under Pandectism private law constituted a coherent system. […] Private

lawyers embraced the ethics of autonomy with which Kant endowed the renaissant legal science around
1800, and saw private law as a system of spheres within which morally autonomous individuals were free
to act as they chose […] This view informed the central institutions of classical private law: individual
rights were an area for the expression of will-power, acts-in-law were the result of unconstrained intention,
contracts constituted a tight bond between independent beings, and property rights of all kinds conveyed in
principle a total and absolute power of dominion and exclusion.” WIEACKER, supra __, 484-485; see also
341-349.
26

KENNEDY, RISE & FALL, supra note __, at 38-39: “When the common lawyers theorized about private

law, they drew on European sources in the tradition of natural rights, according to which all of private law
was the rational working out of immutable, divinely established principles. […] To Classical eyes, private
law natural rights theorizing further aggravated the split between public and private law, since the
positivist, legislatively oriented principles of constitutionalism would not square with the anti-state,
mystically based approach of the natural lawyers.”
27

A. CLAIR CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE

GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 42-43 (Cambridge University Press 2003) (explaining how the
private/public distinction developed, albeit differently, both in civil and in common law.) Sanford
Levinson, Escaping Liberalism: Easier Said Than Done, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1466, 1467 (1983) (reviewing
DAVID KAYRES, ed., THE POLITICS

OF

LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, and locating the distinction of

private and public “worlds” at the core of liberal legalism).

13

contained and sharply differentiated from public law, private law was perceived as
capable of keeping common-good considerations out of private adjudication.
When reduced to an orderly taxonomy of legal concepts, which are placed in a
relation of mutual reference and indifferent to social considerations, private law is a game
of chess. It must be played out on a board divided into a fixed number of slots. The
pieces on the board are predetermined and move according to very firm operational rules.
Within these rules, players are allowed to devise innumerable combinatorial strategies.
The game allows for very creative moves, and, in fact, promotes the use of wit and
genius. But each game begins and ends within the chessboard, as if it were a selfcontained universe. This model exerts an eternal fascination among jurists of all worlds.
As is the case with chess, its popularity is undying.28 In one way or another, it recurs as a
pattern in private law rhetoric.
The survival to this day of classical private law as a mode of discourse is
somewhat surprising. In the first half of the twentieth century, the private/public
distinction came under vehement attack across the western world. In political milieus,
private law had to make room for elements of social policy and redistributive
considerations. The emergence of labor law with its socialized contracts rules, the reconceptualization of property in light of its social function, and the use of tort law for
clearly public regulatory purposes inexorably questioned the soundness of time-honored

28

Cf. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809

(1935) (referring to the famous attack to formalism launched by Rudolf von Jhering, In the Heaven of
Legal Concepts (___) in F. Cohen & M. Cohen, READINGS

IN JURISPRUDENCE AND

LEGAL PHILOSOPHY

678-89 (1951)).

14

dichotomies.29

The classical structure slowly incorporated corrections to bargaining

inequality, interferences with freedom of contract, and constraints upon private
ownership.30 Slowly but surely, private law began to reveal its regulatory implications, its
ties to constitutional dilemmas, and the many cracks in the purity of its design.
Innocence was lost, and private law faced the unavoidable complexity of adulthood. This
development occurred through parallel processes in a number of different nations, and
within a relatively short span of time.31
Legal scholarship adjusted in various ways to these changes. In the US, legal
realists devoted much work to deconstructing the private/public distinction,32 and to
contesting private law’s autonomy from other fields of law and government.33 In
29

Morton Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, esp. at 1426

(1982).
30

Charles Donahue, Jr., The Future of the Concept of Property Predicted from its Past, in PROPERTY 43-44

(J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman eds., New York University Press 1980) (explaining that in the US “[b]y
the middle of the 1930s … federal and state regulation of the economy could no longer be challenged on
the ground that it constituted a deprivation of property rights without substantive due process of law (unless
it could be shown that the legislative scheme failed to meet a minimum test of rationality); and the direct
restrictions on the use of property in the form of comprehensive zoning and planning ordinances had been
sustained even though they involved considerable loss of value to the property owner, so long as they could
be denominated a ‘regulation’ rather than a ‘taking.’”
31

See Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law and Legal thought: 1850-1968, 3 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.

631, 648 ff. (2003) (describing the ‘socialization’ of private law in both Europe and the US as a veritable
wave of globalization at the dawn of the 20th century.)
32

See as an example of such attacks Morris Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, esp. at

562 (1933) (portraying private contracts adjudication as a matter of public policy making.)
33

See, critically, Ernest J. Weinrib, Book Review: Restoring Restitution, 91 VA. L. REV. 861 (2005)

(reviewing HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS

OF

RESTITUTION, Cambridge University Press, 2004,

and regretting that “[T]he traditional internal analysis of common-law doctrine […] is precisely what the
legal realists and their heirs of all varieties aimed to subvert. The academic triumph of legal realism
brought into disrepute the notion that private law involves the articulation of an immanent process of legal
reasoning that aspires to work itself pure. Instead, private law came to be seen in the United States as the
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continental Europe, scholars began to question the possibility of pure deduction, and
advocated the use of techniques meant to steer purely deductive reasoning in socially
meaningful directions.34 Traditional partitions lost the intuitive appeal of clarity, and
were forever doomed to contestation and complexity.35 Scholarly and judicial efforts to
inject social considerations in private-law methodology featured prominently in the
whole western world for a large part of the 20th century.36
Today, domestic private law strives to figure out its own identity and to preserve
what is left of its once sharp defining features. The private/public boundary is by no
means a bright line,37 and provides no sure prediction of judicial outcomes.38 Even in

receptacle of independently desirable goals that are to be infused from the outside. Accordingly, the
juridical exercise of elaborating the law's internal normative impulses was effaced by the political exercise
of identifying and reconciling the goals that are to be given official sanction.” See also Duncan Kennedy &
Marie Claire Belleau, François Geny aux Etats Unis, in FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MYTHES

ET

RÉALITÉS, Yvon

Blais ed., 2000 (exploring the links between American legal realism and anti-formalism in European legal
discourse in early 20th century).
34

Marie-Claire Belleau, The “Juristes Inquiets”: Legal Classicism and Criticism in Early Twentieth-

Century France, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 379.
35

An important part of Wieacker’s story is that this architecture could only maintain its purity in the

absence of social, regulatory elements. WIEACKER, supra note __, at 485. In the 20th century, “the social
state has revolutionized our legal thinking. […] Courts and scholars must respond to the disintegration of
private law produced by these upheavals, and it will be no easy task, for they have not only destroyed the
internal coherence of private law but also undermined the distinction between private and public law,
which our legal system still took for granted at the end of last century.” WIEACKER, supra __ at 438.
36

Kennedy, Two Globalizations, supra __

37

The decline of the traditional administrative state has allowed negotiated self-regulation to allocate public

resources (See Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and
Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121 (2000)) and to define civic responsibilities (see Jody
Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, (1997); Orly Lobel,
The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89
MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004)). Governance through contract is on the rise. It is now commonly understood
that regulatory norms need not be imposed by centralized authorities, but can rather stem from the
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continental Europe, where formalism holds a tighter grip on legal academia and on the
judiciary, jurists are at the very least confronted with the increasingly significant overlap
between private law and constitutional entitlements.39 In the US, the legacy of legal
realism makes main-stream scholars skeptical of anything resembling the purity of
classical legal thought.40 Even the most ambitious reconstructive projects, aimed at
bringing common law doctrines to internal coherence,41 accept as a datum the existence
of competing values, to be weighed and organized along firm theoretical guidelines.42

decentralized self-regulation of private parties. See HARM SCHEPEL, THE CONSTITUTION
GOVERNANCE. PRODUCT STANDARDS

IN THE

REGULATION

OF INTEGRATING

OF

PRIVATE

MARKETS (Hart 2005)___;

Picciotto, Introduction, supra __ at 2.
38

Individual property can be subject to eminent domain even when it stands in the way of projects led by

private parties, in so far as these promise positive externalities. The idea that public purposes can be
pursued through private initiative is now widely accepted. Kelo v. New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
39

Mathias Reimann, Savigny's Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the Close of the Twentieth

Century, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 571, at 585, fn 64 (1999) (“[L]egal realism has never taken firm hold in Europe
and […] the European legal culture as a whole has remained more conservative than its American
counterpart.”)
40

See ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS

CONTEMPORARY THEORIES

OF

OF

CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS

AND

CRITIQUE

OF

CONTRACT LAW (1997), and even E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING

YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED DECISIONS, 37 (1998) (“The instances in which promises should be
enforced are too varied to be shoehorned into the confines of a single rationale.”)
41

See e.g. Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986); CHARLES

FRIED, CONTRACT

AS

PROMISE: A THEORY

OF

CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION

(1981);

Andrew Kull,

Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191 (1995); Weinrib, Restoring Restitution, supra__; Abraham
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531 (2005) (proposing “a
unified theory of property predicated on the insight that property law is organized around creating and
defending the value inherent in stable ownership.”)
42

See Randy E. Barnett, Private Law: The Richness of Contract Theory (reviewing ROBERT A. HILLMAN,

THE RICHNESS

OF

CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS

AND

CRITIQUE

OF

CONTEMPORARY THEORIES

OF

CONTRACT LAW, 1997) 97 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1419 (1999) (criticizing Hillman for “speak[ing] of the
complexity of con tract law as though anyone with whom he disagrees is unaware of this complexity” and
for failing “to realize that one function of contract theory is to understand and sort out complexity…”).
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So why does classical private law still circulate among legal jurists as a
conceptual category with actual currency? Multiple answers are plausible.

ii. The extraordinary resilience of classical private law: a) neo-formalism; b)
innocence regained; c) the rhetoric of dispersion. - The vast diffusion of a formalist
version of private law, indifferent to questions of constitutional values or social
engineering, can be tentatively attributed to a number of causes – namely, the revival of
legal formalism in national scholarly contexts, the necessary impoverishment of privatelaw methodology resulting from its wide transnational circulation, and in the legacy of
post-WWII neo-liberal agendas.

a) Neo-formalism. - Formalism is undergoing considerable revival in contemporary legal
discourse.43 Classical private law assumes a basic faith in the possibility of solving legal
disputes by mere application of principles to facts, with very limited room for judicial
discretion.44 This form of adjudication by deduction is a pillar of legal formalism.
Politically, neo-formalism in private law discourse is often associated with the
conservative agenda of portraying the market of private actors as ideologically neutral,
According to reconstructive private law doctrine, the competing values that must be balanced in the
process of adjudication (such as efficiency, protection of reliance, predictability…) are ideologically
neutral and non-distributive.
43

See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465 (1988), at 516 (noting that “While

theorists associated with legal process, rights theory, and law and economics all attempt to absorb the
insights of legal realism, they also attempt to create a new foundation for legal principles and decisions to
replace the discredited foundations of legal formalism.”)
44

Classical private law is by definition indifferent to the realization of social goals or public policy. See

recently ERNEST J WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 19 (Harvard University Press 1995). Cf. Kenneth
W. Simons, Justification in Private Law, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 698 (1996).
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refractory to regulation, and indifferent to social considerations.45 But there is also a
progressive strand of neo-formalism, which dates back to Max Weber’s defense of legal
rationality.46 In this case, the return to form stems from a profound disillusionment with
the early 20th century idea that private law could be ‘socialized’ by means of ‘soft’
communitarian principles, informally woven into the fabric of private law adjudication.47
Critics of this ‘social’ project identify as symptoms of its failure such phenomena as the
ever-thinner role of the unconscionability doctrine, or the impossibility of pursuing
socially progressive results by invoking the general clause of good faith in contractual
disputes.48 They plead, therefore, for “hard” rules and limited judicial discretion, instead
of soft adjudicatory standards.49 Perhaps not least among the causes for neo-formalist
revivals are the enduring aesthetic appeal of form,50 and the eternal passion of analytical
minds for the logical game of deduction.
Outside the borders of domestic legal systems, the endurance of classical private
law arguments is obviously based on their good health and resilience at home. Other

45

See critically KERRY RITTICH, RE-CHARACTERIZING RESTRUCTURING: LAW, DISTRIBUTION AND GENDER

IN MARKET REFORM
46

(2002).

Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max Weber's

Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031
(2004).
47
48

Anna Di Robilant, Genealogies of Soft Law, __ AM. J. COMP. LAW __ (2006).
Ugo

Mattei,

Hard

Code

Now!,

2:1

GLOBAL

JURIST

FRONTIERS

(2002),

available

at

www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol2/iss1/art1
49

Mattei, Hard Code Now, supra __

50

Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 53 BUFFALO

L. REV. 973, 1027 (2005) (defining formalism "not as an epistemological or political position, but as an
aesthetic propensity, a genre of self-presentation, of engagement with argument and text.")
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bases, however, may explain the particularly high currency of classical private law
among international legal actors.

b) Innocence regained. - Immigrants, even when highly successful in their host country,
remain captive to stereotypes and caricatures. Because subtleties are lost in translation,
the immigrant’s speech comes across as somewhat discontinuous. Listeners fill the gaps
with pre-conceived understandings, folklore and bias. When private law abandons its
nation-based home and migrates to globaland, it meets the immigrant’s fate. Sometimes,
it is subject to superficial treatment and misunderstanding. More often, it gets reduced to
stereotype and fancied in old-fashioned clothes, which it has long outgrown. This process
is not necessarily demeaning.51 Private law may rediscover the power of its tradition. Its
regained simplicity may allow it moves which its actual level of sophistication would not
permit, and which the inhabitants of the host country cannot afford. If skillfully recruited
by host rulers, it may serve as an optimal vehicle for social change. In globaland, it may
become the hero of the day.
Moving outside the state, perhaps thanks to the fact that jurists involved in large
state matters have no time for post-classical vagaries,52 private law seems to have

51

See DIEGO EDUARDO LÓPEZ MEDINA, TEORÍA

CULTURA JURIDICA LATINOAMERICANA,

IMPURA DEL DERECHO.

LA

TRANFORMACIÓN DE LA

2004 (analyzing the transmutation of western legal theory after its

transplant in the legal culture of Latin America).
52

Judges in international law courts are most often recruited among jurists specialized in international law,

who tend to be better versed in foreign languages. Many of them have previously held office in public
administrations or national cabinets, thereby gaining particular fluency with public-law arguments. Judges'
lack of familiarity with private law theory may contribute to explain the particular style of private law
arguments in such courts. See, for data on appointments to the ECJ, Sally J. Kenney, The Members of the
Court of Justice of the European Communities, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 101, esp. at 107 (1999).
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regained the original strength and bright contours of its earlier stages. Current
transnational discourse is dominated by classical private-law rhetoric. In international
law more often than in domestic circles, private law is defined as a source of utterly nonpolitical arguments, and therefore a bulwark of legitimacy for any decision-making body
both inside and outside the nation-state.53 Even if flawed, this definition is capable of
producing momentous legal changes by virtue of its artificial simplicity. In its horizontal
and apolitical dimension, private law can produce unassailable arguments, and change the
nature of any dispute from hotly ideological to seemingly neutral and objective. This
unparalleled rhetorical power makes private law arguments attractive to international
courts and tribunals characterized by questionable legitimacy, political ambivalence, and
lack of democratic credentials.

c) The rhetoric of dispersion. – Yet another reason why the alleged neutrality of private
law enjoys much currency in global discourse is the fact that the medieval image of lex
mercatoria, quintessentially independent from the state both in terms of production and at
the level of enforcement, is experiencing a veritable revival in neo-liberal literature.54
Scholars from many fronts tend to agree that the proliferation of cross-border commerce

53

On the absence of a Realist-type critique of the distinction in international law see Amr A. Shalakany,

Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41
HARV. INT'L L.J. 419, 467 (2000).
54

SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (Columbia U P 1996)

at 15, and –most critically – di Robilant, Genealogies, supra __ (emphasizing the fact that today’s ‘lex
mercatoria’ operates against the background –and with the endorsement—of the state, rather than in the
absence of state powers as in medieval times.)
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prompts the decline of centralized institutions and a serious dispersion of authority.55 In
zero-sum fashion, the growth of private rule-making by business actors is conceptualized
in many quarters as a net decline in state regulation.56 The indifference of private deals to

55

Of course, there is no dearth of qualifying statements in legal scholarship. There is a sense in which the

growth of transnational business, even though quantitatively impressive, does not really diminish the role
and function of the nation-state. To begin with, it is still the case that the bulk of litigation between crossborder parties is submitted to ordinary judicial fora. Conflict-of-law regimes are state-based devices
designed to assign trans-national disputes to competent state courts, with the only caveat that judges may
have to apply foreign rules. If such rules reflect only the ‘private’ law of foreign states and therefore can be
understood as utterly non-political (according to the views of Joseph Story and then Von Savigny: see
Michaels, Globalizing Savigny?, supra __ at p. 5) there is no reason to hypothesize a weakening of the host
state’s control over adjudication policies. Secondly, when parties agree to defer their disputes to arbitration,
they still need traditional courts to enforce arbitral awards. As is well known, courts retain certain forms of
control over awards – most significantly, the ability to vacate arbitral findings that conflict with
considerations of ordre public. Again, the state remains ultimately in charge of private-law adjudication.
Thirdly, states are still the exclusive providers of legal services which constitute the necessary back-drop of
any trade regime, such as the recognition and enforcement of contract and property rules. See SASSEN,
supra__ at 25-26 (noting that “national legal systems remain as the major, or crucial, instantiation through
which guarantees of contract and property rights are enforced.”) The centrality of the state is also
reinforced by the massive participation of mixed (partly private, partly public) corporations in transnational
commerce. See Michael B. Likosky, Compound Corporations: The Public Law Foundations of Lex
Mercatoria, in 3 NON-STATE ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 251 (2003).
56

As a matter of fact, the regulatory monopoly of territorially defined areas is no longer a prerogative of

Westphalian sovereigns. Illustrations abound. The contract clauses negotiated by foreign investors dealing
with largely state-owned Russian companies force the Russian government to embrace standards of
corporate accounting and transparency that have no domestic equivalent in formerly soviet regimes. D.
McBarnet, Transnational Transactions: Legal Work, Cross-border Commerce and Global Regulation, in
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES: GLOBALISATION
Likosky ed., Butterworths 2002).

AND

POWER DISPARITIES 98, 105-06 (Michael B.

Hollywood’s hiring of foreign cheap labor creates political links

between foreign film-industry workers and Californian unions, prompting social unrest and political
upheavals in developing countries. See Michael B. Likosky, "Dual Legal Orders: from Colonialism to
High

Technology",

3
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and

29

(2003),

http://www.bepress.com/gj/topics/vol3/iss2/art2. In all such instances, the globalizing force of private
commerce intersects local political dimensions.
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redistributive concerns is hailed as a triumph of freedom from unnecessary governmental
intervention.57
This tendency to underestimate the regulatory or redistributive implications of
private transactions finds theoretical support in the liberal separation between (private)
market and (public) government. Private law categories have been used since World War
II to signal the disjuncture between international commerce and national laws. By this
account, commerce is private in so far as it relies on disaggregated, discrete transactions
between actors motivated by profit-maximizing agendas, and therefore indifferent to state
politics or government.58
This neo-liberal view has long been criticized for actually contributing to, rather
than simply describing, the disentanglement of international commerce from national
mechanisms of social and democratic control.59 Neo-liberal dichotomies also fail to
acknowledge the possibility of new regulatory regimes, stemming from horizontal
networks.60 They ignore, for instance, that the deployment of domestic private laws in

57

Klaus Peter Berger, Transnational Commercial Law in the Age of Globalization, Centro di Studi e

Ricerche di Diritto Comparato e Straniero, directed by M.J. Bonell, Rome, 2001, Seminar Paper # 42, p.
11.
58

RITTICH, supra, __

59

A. Claire Cutler, Artifice, Ideology and Paradox: The Public/Private Distinction in International Law, 4

REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 261, 262 (1997). See Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown:
The Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 209 (2002) (referring critically to this phenomenon as ‘liftoff.’)
60

Both network theory (supra __) and norms scholarship share with neo-liberalism the tendency to shift the

emphasis away from the state, and onto discrete clusters of private action. On the links between continental
network theory and US-based norms scholarship see Robert D. Cooter, Law, Economics, & Norms:
Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law
Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1647 (1996). Both schools diverge significantly from neo-liberalism,
however, when they point at the tremendous regulatory spill-over of such clusters, and describe their self-
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cross-border litigation (as in the case of transnational tort claims against multinational
companies)

can

promote

desirable

redistributive

policies.61

These

critiques

reflexive rule-making activity as real law by sociological standards. See Teubner, Global Bukowina, supra
at 4 (describing the emerging global law as “a legal order in its own right” not to be measured “by the
standards of national legal systems.”) These schools generate, in turn, multiple normative stances.
According to some authors, rule-making by private networks should be hailed as a welcome grass-roots
expression of regulatory goals that traditional democratic processes have failed to identify. See SCHEPEL,
supra note __, at 408 (arguing that “[t]here is, in principle, a normatively plausible case to be made for
private governance beyond the state.”) Hugh Collins, The Freedom to Circulate Documents: Regulating
Contracts in Europe, 10 EUR.L.J. 787, and HUGH COLLINS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT (London: Weidenfeld
and Nicolson 1986), 208, (but see critically Jack Beermann, Contract Law as a System of Values, 67
B.U.L. Rev. 553 (1987)). Scholars emphasize that because regional or global institutions tend to suffer
from one form or another of democratic deficit and regulatory under-capacity, dispersed private lawmaking bodies may provide alternative, or at least concurrent, loci of law production. See e.g. Christian
Joerges & Jürgen Neyer, From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The
Constitutionalisation of Comitology, 3 EUR. L.J. 273 (1997). Most prominent in this respect is the
theoretical architecture of deliberative democracy – a complex post-national coordination of grass-root
deliberative levels, within an overarching constitutional design still populated by centralized authorities. J.
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS

AND

NORMS – CONTRIBUTIONS

TO A

DISCOURSE THEORY

OF

LAW

AND

DEMOCRACY 350 (Cambridge: MIT Press 1995): “The constitutional structure of the political system is
preserved only if government officials hold out against corporate actors and bargaining partners and
maintain the asymmetrical position that results from their obligation to represent the whole of an absent
citizenry...” Others, by contrast, deem private ordering a tool exploited by economic and political elites to
consolidate their dominance, to establish codes of conduct that favor their interests only, and to bypass all
forms of democratic control. See e.g. MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (Harvard University
Press 2000); James Boyle, Foucault in Cybersace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hard-Wired Censors, 66
U. CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997); Katerina Sideri, Questioning the Neutrality of Procedural Law: Internet
Regulation in Europe through the Lenses of Bourdieu's Notion of Symbolic Capital, 10 E.L. J. 61 (2004);
Shalakany, supra __ (noticing how the private/public distinction, operating as a bias in the minds of
international arbitrators, ends up confirming the subordination of developing countries.)
61

Robert Wai, Transnational Private Law and Private Ordering in a Contested Global Society, 46 HARV.

INTL. L.J. 471 (2005). See also Craig, Scott & Wai, Transnational Governance of Corporate Conduct
through the Migration of Human Rights Norms: The Potential Contribution of Transnational ‘Private’
Litigation, in Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand & Gunther Teubner eds., TRADITIONAL GOVERNANCE
AND

CONSTITUTIONALISM 287, 290 (Hart 2004): “[T]he existence of a multiplicity of international and
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notwithstanding, the neo-liberal separation between private global commerce and public
local government still offers a convenient backdrop for many analytical projects, whereby
the private and public levels remain conceptually distinct and formally independent from
one another.
From the stand-point of these pages, he problem with this line of scholarship is
one of emphasis.

An excessive focus on the spontaneity of private interactions

underestimates the role of private law categories in the restructuring of post-national
government. The contribution of private law discourse to the coagulation of sovereignty
into new institutions with many state-like features remains all too often in the shade.

iii. The homogeneity of private law discourse and the common/civil-law divide. The commonality of private-law discourse throughout the western world – a basic
assumption of this article – is by now an acknowledged phenomenon.62 The celebrated
dichotomy between judge-made common law and civil-law statutes is blurring away.63
European code-based systems give increasing prominence to judicial precedents, even
making room for policy arguments in hard cases.64 The sharing of conceptual categories

domestic legal institutions provide venues that are points of potential conflict and dispute between different
systems of interests and values. The end of the pre-eminence of state law and the failure of any world
government is not yet so dramatic as to end the need to consider familiar venues and styles of law-making
and disputing.”
62

See BERMAN, LAW

AND

REVOLUTION, supra __. AUGUSTO CANNATA & ANTONIO GAMBARO,

LINEAMENTI DI STORIA DELLA GIURISPRUDENZA EUROPEA II, 4th ed. 1989, Torino, 129-135.
63

Mitchell de S.O.l'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Disclosure in the French Legal System,

104 YALE L.J. 1325, (1995); Martin A. Rogoff, The French (R)evolution of 1958-1998, 3 COLUM. J. EUR.
L. 453, (1997).
64

MITCHEL
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S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
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JUDICIAL

TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY, OUP 2005. See also Cooter, supra __ 1651 (noticing that interpretation
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is increasingly visible.65 In the new as in the old Continent, private law is a blend of the
same constituent elements – a natural-law basis, abundant layers of rationalist
organization, systemic qualities, and a constant oscillation between formalism and
functional adaptation to societal change. What seems to remain different in the way in
which private law is conceptualized on the two sides of the Atlantic is its relation to
sovereignty and constitutional structures.66
In Europe, where traditional ‘public’ matters such as judicial review and
federalism are undergoing major supranational restructuring and re-conceptualization,
scholars are busy revisiting national private law doctrines, reconstructing their

of civil codes often coincides with a search for social norms); ROBERTO PARDOLESI & BRUNO TASSONE, I
GIUDICI E L’ANALISI ECONOMICA DEL DIRITTO,

Bologna 2003 (tracking the use of economic arguments in

civil adjudication in Italian courts.)
65

On the profound connections between European and American legal academia in the inter-war and post-

WWII periods see Ugo Mattei, Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western Law, 42 AM. J.
COMP. L. 195, 206 (1994).
66

This argumentative stance does not ignore stylistic differences and the divergent impact of cultural

heritage on the legal traditions of common and civil law. On such differences see most forcefully Pierre
Legrand, European Legal Systems are not Converging, 45 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 52 (1996), and Vivian
Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the
Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63 (2001). See also, amongst most recent
contributions, Philippe A. Schmidt, The Economic Dimension of Legal Systems: Civil Law and Common
Law, 51 LOY. L. REV. 27 (2005) (emphasizing the broader diffusion, higher predictability, and firmer
theoretical structure of the Civil Law); Markus G. Puder, Beer Wars - A Case Study: Is the Emerging
European Private Law Civil or Common or Mixed or Sui Generis?, 20 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 37, 53-54
(2005) (noticing, among others, differences in terns of style of legal thinking and reasoning). I aim,
however, at linking the comparativists' debate on civil/common-law differences to the question of the
relation between private law and governance. On this question see, most recently, Kevin Kordana and
David Tabachnick, Rawls & Contract Law (February 2005), University of Virginia Legal Working Paper
Series, University of Virginia John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper Series,
Working Paper 15 (http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/olin/art15), and the Virginia Law Review Symposium
on Contemporary Political Theory and Private Law, February 17-18, 2006.
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genealogies, reconsidering their implications for the welfare of EU citizens and assessing
their regulatory potential.67 The connection between private law and government is
paramount and self evident in light of historical legacies.

Private law absolved a

prominent state-making function in 18th and 19th century continental Europe. Napoleon’s
imperial vision relied both on military victories and on the success of his codification
design.68 In the revolutionary project of breaking away from feudal constraints and
judicial superpower, sovereignty implicated the ability to ensure the smooth running of
private activities along the lines of pre-defined criteria, such as individual freedom and
private property. The emphasis on private law codification was accompanied by rhetoric
that downplayed the role of judges and portrayed the command of the legislator as
determinative of adjudicatory outcomes.69 By funneling the infinite varieties of human
disputes through a limited set of organizing categories, and apparently ensuring the
predictability of their outcomes, private-law codification allowed the incipient state to
perform an allegedly essential function of government. Elsewhere in Europe, other
sovereigns of grand visions undertook the task of guaranteeing predictability in the
adjudication of private disputes. A uniform system of private law within precise
territorial borders became a main ingredient of the modern nation-state. Like France,
many other European nations linked the definition of a coherent body of private law to
67
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state unity, constitutional breakthroughs,70 and national identity.71 As a result of these
legacies, “private law systems” are usually meant to be comprehensive bodies of rules
whose source and enforcement are distinctly public, because legislators and judges
clearly belong to the institutional apparatus of the modern state. This kind of private law,
rather than breaking away from traditional state sovereignty, has often performed a
significant state-making function in Western legal history. Eastern Europe’s rush to
(re)codification in the aftermath of democratization highlights the vitality of this legacy.72
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In the U.S., the role of the common law (of property, torts, and contracts) in legal
discourse is seemingly different. Common law is considered a “strong supplement”73 of
political democracy, but not a constituent or defining element of sovereignty. Federalism
has disjoined the state monopoly of common law adjudication from a number of
Washington-based functions of government.74 The option of private law codification was
contemplated in 19th-century America, but the very idea of ‘creating’ by legislative fiat
laws that should only be ‘found’ in pre-existing truths encountered principled
opposition,75 and was blocked by conservative forces.76 The values of continuity with the
past and adaptability to future social developments triumphed over the opposite virtues of
certainty and predictability. The ‘soft’ codification practice of the restatements, given its
emphatically non-binding nature, does not formally break with tradition. The common
law can still be conceptualized as an organic creature77 in constant tension between its
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past and its future, irreducible to rigid schemes and therefore refractory to legislative
intervention.78
As a result the connection between private law and the exercise of centralized
sovereignty, so deeply rooted in European history, remains less visible and less intuitive
in the U.S. In common-law jargon, the wording “private law system” is often understood
to be the product of private law-making sources – as in the case of closely-knit business
communities developing self-reflexive norms of interaction for their members.79 The
state-breaking implications of private autonomy gain utmost visibility in the now
extensive literature on “norms” or “private ordering.”80 The old law-merchant of the
Middle Ages provides a convenient genealogy for this discursive strand, whereby private
disputes are resolved not on the basis of legislative fiat, but rather according to prepositive norms to be found in morals or reason.81
Norms are private guidelines of conduct, which, by definition, are not subject to
judicial enforcement, and therefore antipodal to private-law rules produced by and
enforced through the state.82
78
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emergent character, which is allegedly best attuned to the needs and efficiency concerns
of discrete communities.83 Norm scholars disagree – today as in the times of Llewellyn –
as to the merits of elevating private norms to the status of enforceable rules by either
incorporating them in statutes or instructing courts to follow them in formal
adjudication.84 Yet they all conceive of law production as appropriately independent
from the state at least at its inception.

iv. State-making and state-breaking in western private law. - This tension
between the new and the old Continent – namely, the outlined contrast between
centripetal and centrifugal trends in private law discourse – does not take away from the
substantial homogeneity of western private law.
A constant feature of private law in its global manifestations is its ambivalence.
Like a coin of the Roman empire, private law displays, in its transnational circulation,
either of two sides. One side points at purely local, centrifugal dimensions (in Roman
coins, religious rituals or symbols of harvest). But the flip side shows, unmistakably, the
head of the Emperor, and links even the most discrete, peripheral form of exchange to a
powerful centralized infrastructure.
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The two inseparable strands of classical private law discourse synergize and
produce a powerful legitimating function in transnational settings. Private law can easily
permeate the international arena and acquire high currency when deployed in its prepositivist, disaggregating mode, which presupposes the lack of centralized hierarchies,
and emphasizes spontaneity and dispersion of sovereignty. This mode prevails in global
settings. Once popular and widely diffuse, however, private law discourse can emphasize
the values of coherence, internal logic, symmetry of concepts, and the virtues of a system
that aspires to channel all human interactions into patterns of moral or economic
soundness. In this technical and seemingly neutral mode, private law can produce the
non-intuitive effect of reinforcing centralized authorities as they struggle to emerge in a
post-national scenario.
With this image in mind, it is possible to take a fresh look at the world of postnational developments, in order to identify a number of most interesting coin-flips.

II. STATE-MAKING THROUGH PRIVATE LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE:
CASE STUDIES

1. Private law and the rise of new institutions. - The on-going proliferation of
non-governmental adjudicatory bodies of international law is an increasingly important
topic in both academic and political circles. 85 In contrast to the traditional realist view of
international law, whereby diplomacy, raw politics, and states’ self interest dominate the
85
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scene of intergovernmental relations, scholars are placing growing emphasis on the role
of international courts and tribunals. In such adjudicatory bodies, international law might
‘harden’ and finally produce a quasi-constitutional architecture for smoother relations in
a global community.86
The few courts and tribunals that allow access to private parties provide the
highest forms of ‘judicialization’ on the international scene. In such fora, individual
rights can be used as shields against governmental takings or trespasses, in apparent
disregard of political arguments. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Luxembourg
and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg have long implemented
this model. In a totally different context, but again with the object of replacing gun-boat
diplomacy with rule-of-law adjudication, NAFTA has more recently provided foreign
investors with the opportunity to handle their disputes with host states before impartial
arbitral panels.87 Scholars have observed, however, that even when non-state actors are
given access to international courts, governments still design non-domestic adjudicatory
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systems in such a way as to leave themselves political safety valves.88 For international
adjudication to appear credible and overcome such critiques, more than a generic appeal
to the rule of law is necessary. Where the consolidation of international law into hard,
predictable rules is desirable, it is important that disputes be handled in an “adversarial
setting between two clearly identified litigants.”89 In other words, horizontality enhances
the credibility of adjudication.
Private law discourse, in the simplified version so popular in international circles,
is horizontal by definition. The following pages provide three different accounts of the
way in which private law can effectively consolidate the power of international
adjudicatory systems, by lending them the appearance of impartiality, adherence to the
rule of law,90 and deafness to the noise of international politics.
We start with the contribution of private law discourse to the creation of new
powerful institutions in post-WWII Europe. For roughly 50 years, the economic and
political integration of the old Continent has been facilitated by the adoption of a legal
structure often referred to as supranationalism. In this model, inter-state obligations are
88
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reinforced by states’ specific obligations towards their own citizens, recognized and
enforced by local courts. The collaboration of national enforcement authorities lends
strength to otherwise toothless international commitments.91
The first illustration of this phenomenon pertains to the judicial discourse of the
ECtHR, which partakes of several supranational features.

This court’s jurisdiction

extends over a geographic and political area significantly larger and less homogeneous
than the European Union, and is often called to adjudicate human rights matters against
the background of political revolutions and coups d’état. We shall observe how the use
of private law paradigms may help this court bypass thorny issues of international politics
and handle state-citizen relations as if simply governed by rule-of-law criteria.
In a sense, this illustration is marginal. The role of private law discourse in the
Strasbourg court is minor, subliminal, and indirect. The entire worldview of the actors
involved (parties, governments and judges) is shaped by public law considerations. But
the example is nonetheless quite telling. Even when buried in the subtext, private law
can strangely depoliticize the context of human rights disputes and allow for otherwise
unpalatable, ideologically colored holdings.
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INSTITUTIONAL LAW 46-48 (4th rev. ed., 2003). It is thanks to these features that supranational institutions
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The logic of

supranationalism is highly appealing to international lawyers preoccupied with the traditional
ineffectiveness of international law. Supranational models of adjudication have successfully been applied in
the field of international human rights.
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Arranged in a crescendo, the second illustration pertains to a much more overt use
of private law doctrines to strengthen the institutional design of the EU. Over the years,
Community law has increasingly populated the realm of disputes between private parties,
and utilized the ideologically neutral strength of private law remedies in state courts to
enhance its effectiveness. In many ways, this has proven a highly effective way of
bypassing political resistance to the expansion of ‘federal’ powers and to the
constitutional establishment of the EU legal order.
The third illustration is the most explicit of the three, and is set on a stage fully
dominated by private law considerations. It focuses on lex mercatoria, and explores yet
another mode in which private law can contribute to constitutionalize otherwise feeble
legal systems.

In transnational commerce, private contracts are sufficient to devise

substantive rules and to establish private arbitration bodies, seemingly independently
from state-based institutions.92 Once legitimized by this triumph of private autonomy,
new substantive law and new quasi-judicial fora may lead, as if by necessity, to the
creation of powerful post-national institutions.

ii. Private law and state-making in human rights adjudication. - International
human rights regimes that are exclusively based on the purely contractual paradigm of
intergovernmental treaties tend to be weak.93 By contrast, granting individuals direct
access to a supranational court, whose jurisdiction and authority are fully recognized by
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member governments, has created the most successful enforcement of human rights
against states.94
Though

substantially

more

resilient

than

traditional

intergovernmental

agreements, this supranational model of human rights enforcement still bears weakening
traits. The vertical relationship between a sovereign state and its rights-bearing citizens is
necessarily characterized by a great deal of discretion.

It is common, and in fact

mandatory, for a government to define the area of individual rights in such a way as to
maximize the public good. The amount of restrictions that can be legally imposed upon
fundamental liberties is a function of a state’s definition of both collective needs and
individual entitlements.95 Deciding what amounts to a human rights violation and what
remains, by contrast, a legitimate use of state power is often a matter of political
sensibility.

A supranational human rights court preoccupied with preserving its

legitimacy and authority always walks a fine line between lawful use of judicial
discretion and encroachment upon sovereign political choices.96 When dealing with
relations among sovereign governments, such a court also runs the risk of privileging the
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world-view of certain signatory states while penalizing others, and therefore abdicating
its role of super partes enforcer. Faced with highly politicized questions and conflicting
views in the international community, the court may often decide to deny claims on
preliminary grounds of admissibility.

Alternatively, judges will admit petitioners’

applications, but then engage in a more or less intentional quest for formalist solutions
and objective adjudicatory guidelines, exonerating them from charges of ideological bias.
In the famous Loizidou case, discussed and adjudicated by the ECtHR at different
points in time throughout the 1990’s, the rhetoric of private law effectively performed the
function of de-politicizing controversial issues, making decisions possible and conferring
them legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. 97
Ms. Loizidou, a resident of Nicosia, owned land in the Northern part of Cyprus,
but could not access or develop it according to her wishes, because of the known political
split of the island.98 In 1989, Ms. Loizidou had taken part in a march organized by the
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“Women Walk Home” movement, meant to assert the right of Greek Cypriot refugees to
return to their land in the Northern part of the island. The demonstration had involved
crossing the UN buffer zone and, for some women, even reaching past the Turkish
forces’ line.99 During the demonstration, Ms. Loizidou had been arrested and detained by
Turkish soldiers, and was now seeking redress before the Strasbourg court. The case had
the usual vertical dimension, with an aggrieved individual petitioning against a signatory
state (Turkey).100 The facts of the case, however, took place in the Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which is neither a party to the European Convention nor, by
most accounts, a state.101 Turkey disclaimed any official involvement in the actions of
the TRNC.102 Against this background, how could the Court offer Ms. Loizidou
Northern Cyprus, an entity that the international community, with the exception of Turkey, refuses to
recognize as a state. HANNAY, supra, at 8.
99
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protection without disputing in any way the lawfulness of Turkey’s military presence on
the island? How could it find Loizidou’s application admissible, and yet avoid venturing
in “a highly political area”?103
The applicant lamented the violation of a number of Convention articles
(prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment, right to liberty and security, right of
respect for private and family life), but the Court systematically rejected her claims.104
The applicant’s property rights were all that carried the day for her.
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A protocol added to the Convention in 1952 devotes its first article to the
“Protection of Property.” Property is a philosophical and political concept with many
dimensions. Within the relatively narrow universe of positive law, property is at the same
time governed by private law, constitutions, and human rights charters. Conventionally,
in the western world, constitutions protect ownership from arbitrary government takings,
and make lawful takings conditional upon payment of compensation. The constitutional
guarantee of property pertains, in other words, to vertical relations between states and
citizens, and attempts to strike a balance between individual ownership and public
interests. By contrast, the regulation of property by means of private law addresses
horizontal disputes between two or more parties claiming conflicting entitlements to the
same ‘thing.’ While constitutional property clauses pertain to discretionary exercise of
state powers, classical private-law doctrines are allegedly aimed at solving only conflicts
between litigants.105 When using these doctrines in court, judges may exercise judicial
discretion in balancing the interests of the parties involved, but they may not directly
account for public interests or redistributive policies of any kind.
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Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
221 [hereinafter European Convention] She also claimed violations of her right of access to property
Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, Europ. T.S. No. 9 [hereinafter Protocol No.
1]. Loizidou v. Turkey, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 113 para. 34 (1995) (Preliminary Objections). The Court found
that Ms. Loizidou’s detention had been lawful, as in compliance with rules established to safeguard the
buffer zone separating the two parts of the island for reasons of safety. Loizidou v. Turkey, 20 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 99, 117-18, para. 76-85 (1995) (Preliminary Objections).
105

Daryl J. Levinson, supra__, 1313.

41

The property clause of the Convention’s protocol, for the most part, addresses
vertical conflicts between sovereign states and their subjects, and has a distinct
constitutional flavor:
[…] No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the
public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the
general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not,
however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it
deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or
penalties.
The ECtHR regularly interprets this provision in the context of most varied
disputes. Case subjects range from rent-control legislation in Italy to confiscation of
private property in Romania.106 Each time, in unmistakably constitutional jargon and
with constant recourse to balancing tests, the Court determines whether the respondent
state has overreached in its definition and pursuit of the public interest.107
In the Loizidou case, this vertical dimension yielded nothing for the applicant.
The court acknowledged that Ms. Loizidou had been refused access to her land since
1974 and that she had “effectively lost all control over, as well as all possibilities to use
and enjoy, her property.”108 This interference with her property rights, however, could
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See e.g. Vasilescu v. Romania, 73 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1043 (May 22, 1998), 1998 Y.B. Eur. Conv.

On H.R. 280, 28 Eur. H. R. Rep. 241, and Brumarescu v. Romania, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 862 (1999).
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Fredin v. Swedin, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 784 (Feb. 18, 1991), 13 Eur. H. R. Rep. 784. “The Court

must determine whether a fair balance was struck between the demands of the general interest of the
community and the requirements of the individual's fundamental rights. Inherent in the whole system of the
Convention is the assurance of such balance which is reflected also in the structure of Article 1 of Protocol
I.” For an analysis of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence in matters of property see Sanja Djajic, The Right to
Property and the Vasilescu v. Romania Case, 27 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 363, esp. at 369-378
(2000).
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Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513, 533 para. 63 (1997) (Merits).
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not “be regarded as either a deprivation of property or a control of use”109 because
Turkey, the respondent government, simply lacked the legal capacity to expropriate
anyone on Cypriot land.110 This was a vertical dispute with no vertex.
The case could have ended there, and go to history as yet another dismissal of
private owners’ claims to land situated in occupied territories.111 Such a holding would
also have met with the approval of several members of the court.112 But the Grand
Chamber’s majority concluded otherwise, and thought it feasible to adjudicate the case
along legal, non-political lines. The proper textual basis for Ms. Loizidou’s complaint
was to be found not in the above-quoted portion of the Convention’s property clause, but
rather in its opening line: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
109

Id.
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Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513, 528, para. 49 (1997) (Merits): As submitted by Ms. Lozidou

and echoed by the Cypriot government, “the authorities alleged to have interfered with the right to the
peaceful enjoyment of possessions are not those of the sole legitimate government of the territory in which
the property is situated.”
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Individual claims for compensation, brought before international tribunals, tend to be successful only

after the inter-national dispute is fully solved, and only on the basis of peace treaties between occupying
and occupied countries. See Eyal Benvenisti and Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights in the
Future Israeli-Palestinian Settlement, 89 A.J.I.L. 295, 331-332 (1995).
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Six out of the seventeen judges composing the Grand Chamber produced a total of 5 forceful dissenting

opinions; two other judges wrote a concurring opinion. Judge Gölcüklü, in particular, thought that allowing
Loizidou’s claim to prevail would equal to venturing in a highly political area, far beyond the jurisdiction
of the court. Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513, 547-48 (1997) (Merits) (Dissenting opinion of
Judge Gölcüklü, par 1). Gölcüklü is the Turkish member of the Court. In his view, Ms. Loizidou’s victory
in court would imply an impermissible assessment of “the capacity in which Turkey is present in northern
Cyprus” or of “the legal existence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.”Id. “[I]n the present case” –
Gölcüklü warned his brethren — “… it is impossible to separate the political aspects of the case from the
legal aspects.”Id. at 551, Par 4. Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513, 536 (1997) (Merits). The
dissenting opinion of judge Bernhardt joined by judge Lopes Rocha, at para. 1, contained analogous
remarks: “A unique feature of the present case is that it is impossible to separate the situation of the
individual victim from a complex historical development and a no less complex current situation.”)
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enjoyment of his possessions.”

This switch of textual basis – from de jure

“deprivation…in the public interest” to de facto interference with “peaceful
enjoyment”113 – empowered the Court to review the same facts according to more
stringent criteria. Turkey’s actions did not amount to legal expropriation or taking of
Lozidou’s property. Yet as a matter of sheer fact, possession had been disrupted. At this
level, the Court was willing to reject Turkey’s political justifications as wholly
insufficient.114
Interestingly, the distinction between ownership and possession is firmly based on
private law doctrines.115 Moreover, “peaceful enjoyment of possession” is private law
jargon, heard often in the context of neighbors’ disputes, and is aptly used in the context
of such torts as nuisance or trespass on land.116 It also characterizes tenants’ complaints
against landlords,117 lessees’ grievances against lessors,118 and relatives’ disputes
concerning the use of family property.119 Strasbourg’s property clause is mostly aimed at
vertical relations, but its beginning alludes to such basic canons of private law as the
owner’s ius excludendi – the right to exclude all others from his land and its corollary
113

On the distinction between these two different dimensions of Article 1 Protocol 1, as articulated in other
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RIGHTS 94-95 (1995).
114

Turkey’s justifications were based on the doctrine of necessity, on the fact that at the time the two parts

of the island were engaged in “intercommunal talks” in pursuit of diplomatic solutions, and on the need to
rehouse displaced Turkish Cypriot refugees after the Turkish intervention in the Island in 1974. Loizidou v.
Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513, 533 para. 64 (1997) (Merits).
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right of action against trespassers. The Turkish Government was liable not because of
any discretionary exercise of sovereign powers that could be imputed to it; rather, it was
liable because its soldiers happened to interfere with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment
of her possession, just as a noisy neighbor or an intrusive landlord might have done. Ms.
Loizidou’s problems stemmed simply from “an individual act of Turkish troops directed
against her property.”120

Reduced to this anodyne horizontal dimension, Turkey’s

condemnation in Strasbourg became plausible and palatable.121
In time, the Loizidou judgment paved the way to a series of judicial122 and
legislative123 developments that greatly expanded the scope of Greek Cypriots’
entitlements in Northern Cyprus. But it took private law jargon to alleviate the judges’
fear of touching this political third rail.
120

See Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513, 536 (1997) (Merits) (Dissenting opinion of the vice-

president of the court, Judge Bernhardt, joined by Judge Lopes Rocha) (criticizing the majority’s
reductionist view of the case).
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Following the judgment on the merits, in 1998 the Court awarded Loizidou both pecuniary and

nonpecuniary damages “in respect of the anguish and feelings of helplessness and frustration which the
applicant must have experienced over the years in not being able to use her property as she saw fit.”
Loizidou v. Turkey, (Article 50), 1998-IV (1998), para. 39. Loizidou finally received 457,084.83 CYP in
compensation. Loizidou v. Turkey, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. D5, D10 (1998) (Just Satifaction).
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The Court made it clear that the holding was specifically tailored to Ms. Loizidou’s peculiar

circumstances, and did not implicate the general situation of the property rights of Greek Cypriots in
northern Cyprus (Loizidou v. Turkey, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD 9, para. 40 (1998) (Just Satisfaction)).
However, later holdings in Strasbourg have been much harsher against Turkey in matters of Greek
Cypriots’ property rights. See e.g. Cyprus v. Turkey. 35 Eur.H.R. Rep. 30 (2002) (Merits) (especially para.
77, where the court greatly expands the definition of Turkey’s liability stemming from Loizidou principles);
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45

iii. European Integration through Private Law. - In the 1980s, a path breaking
project of the European University Institute entitled “Integration through Law” launched
a series of inquiries on the legal strategies that could most effectively promote political
and economic cooperation among traditionally independent sovereign states.124 The main
focus of that project was the ongoing progression of European nation-states toward a
quasi-federal model, in which competencies and powers would be transferred to central
authorities while keeping sovereignty in the hands of constituent members. Though the
European Economic Community (EEC) did not aim to become a federal government, its
aspirations were indeed State-building, at least in the loose sense of the term adopted in
these pages. The legislative institutions established in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome
lacked the usual democratic credentials of national parliaments. In order to operate
effectively, they had to gain further legitimacy in the eyes of the peoples of Europe. The
surprising activism of the Community’s only judicial body, the ECJ, begged for
institutional justification. Because the European architecture needed reinforcement to
continue to exist and to expand further, a new legal system had to be built.125
The fully fledged legal order established over the past fifty years and now known
as the EU is commonly understood as a creature of public law. Its history and institutions
can be explained with the jargon and conceptual categories of public law’s three main
articulations – international, constitutional, and administrative law. The project of
124

CAPPELLETTI, SECCOMBE & WEILER Eds, INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN

FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (1986).
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See Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991) (esp. at 2410 ff.,

analyzing the foundational work of the ECJ that gave the Community, “in stark change from the original
conception of the Treaty, its basic legal and political characteristics.” )
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integrating the six founding members began with what looked like a classic international
treaty, signed by State representatives and characterized by abundant homage to State
sovereignty. The institutional status of the Treaty of Rome – most noticeably the direct
enforceability of many Treaty provisions in national courts – lacked precedents in the
history

of

intergovernmental

relations,

and

required

new

international-law

conceptualization.126 Where international lawyers could not reach, constitutionalists
stepped in, and explained that national constitutions had or could make room for areas of
shared or delegated sovereignty.127

The judicial reviewability of Brussels-made

legislation – another fundamental trait of the European legal structure – was based on a
French model of administrative law. 128
Private lawyers were nowhere to be seen. In the 1980s, it was still not clear that
private law could have anything to contribute to this form of State-making. Throughout
its two volumes, Integration through Law paid only tangential attention to civil codes and
incipient private-law harmonization.129 Two decades later, it is instead apparent that
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Treaty provisions, and making such provisions enforceable on behalf of individual parties in disputes
before national courts, the ECJ “reversed the normal presumption of public international law whereby
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Rewriting Van Gend & Loos: Towards a Normative Theory of ECJ Hermeneutics (2006, manuscript on
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private law methodologies have contributed a great deal to the creation of supra-national
legal structures in the EU. The establishment of a supranational entity requires achieving
two different goals. The first one, state-breaking, consists of softening the sovereignty of
the entity’s constituent members at the margins. The second one, State-making, involves
endowing the new entity with a set of substantive rules of law capable of binding both
constituent governments and individual citizens.

As the legal history of the Union

illustrates, private law achieves both.
The main private-law steps on the path to Europeanization can be summarized as
follows. The first move consisted of allowing Brussels’ law into the realm of inter-private
disputes. Already in 1976, the ECJ held that such Treaty provisions as the prohibition of
gender discrimination (EEC Article 119) were to be obeyed not only by the Community’s
member-States (the immediate addressees of Treaty commands), but also by private
employers in purely horizontal relations.130 The possibility that Treaty provisions would
have horizontal direct effect seriously upset the custom of keeping international norms
out of the purview of inter-private litigation.131 Yet this holding squared perfectly with
the celebrated consistency of private contract rules, which are meant to bind in identical
fashion both the state – whenever it acts in the capacity of private employer – and its
States.”); Id. at 256 (“[P]olitical and technical obstacles may make it impossible for the harmonization of
substantive law to keep pace with the dismantling of economic frontiers.”); 3 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW,
supra note__, at 372-374 (on the impossibility of reviving doctrinal legal unity in Europe).
130
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GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 251 (2nd ed., 2002)
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Treaty provisions have been found to have direct horizontal effect: TEC Artt. 81-82, (prohibition of
anticompetitive agreements and of abuse of market dominance) and TEC Art. 39

(prohibition of

nationality discrimination against workers from other EC states).
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citizens. Thanks to the private-law axiom of across-the-board consistency, European
integration smoothly conquered the land of private contracts. Its entrenchment in states’
legal systems, as a result, became immensely more significant.
Next came the battle for remedies. Born out of the agreement of six equally
sovereign nations, Community law bore the stigma of unenforceability typical of
international treaties. To redress this fundamental weakness, first the ECJ requested that
national courts grant the remedy of restitution to citizens who had paid money into State
coffers, when such payments turned out to be contrary to Community law.132 Restitution
is a typical public-law remedy invoked by citizens in vertical disputes when public
agencies have imposed illegal charges. A much fuller range of remedies, however, could
only be found in private law, which allows for recovery of reliance and even expectation
damages when contracts are broken, and occasionally opens the door to deterrence when
torts are redressed. The ECJ therefore demanded, in purposely general terms, that rules
stemming directly from Community law be equipped with as full a range of remedies as
attached to analogous state-based rules.133 Since then, the ECJ has doggedly promoted
the doctrine of effective compensation for losses suffered by any individual as a result of
Community law infringements. The result applies with equal force in vertical and
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horizontal relations.134 It is now well established, for instance, that defendants in private
litigation may have to pay tort and/or contract damages if found to have breached
European antitrust norms.135 Community law adds causes of action to the roster of civil
law rights and arms them with the full remedial apparatus of private law enforcement.
Even though cloaked in anodyne jus-naturalist jargon (ubi jus ibi remedium),136 this is a
momentous institutional development for the Union. Most significantly, the reach of
European law well into the realm of private disputes is generally understood as the only
way to achieve an altogether different and superior level of effectiveness.
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The latest move conducted through private-law strategies is the ongoing project of
producing a uniform European private law – either in piecemeal fashion, by way of
harmonization directives of narrow scope, or in the comprehensive style of a
supranational civil code. Harmonization by directives is by now a frequent course of
action. The project of codification, by contrast, is still in its early stages, but it is gaining
political momentum.137 It may not be considered ‘State-making’ in so far as it stems
from the somewhat spontaneous work of legal academia, engaged in the free pursuit of
studying the common roots of the several private laws of the member states.138 Equally
spontaneous may be the grass-root attempts to produce uniform rules meant to govern
private transactions across state borders, so as to facilitate trade and promote free
movement.139 Jurists involved in the project appear sometimes to proceed in the mode of
the historical school of 19th-century Germany, which systematized and refined German
legal science in a purely scholarly spirit, and only incidentally produced the building
blocks of what would later become the German civil code.140
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remembering that the German civil code, once adopted, was heralded as a symbol of
national unity – a state-making artifact par excellence.141
For the past twenty years, Brussels has engaged in private-law harmonization,
aligning member state rules on such subjects as products liability, unfair terms in
consumer contracts, and time-shared ownership. EU legislators base the harmonization
of private law on the necessity of allowing smoother inter-state transactions and leveling
the playing field for business entities throughout the internal market. This functionalist
logic weighs against states’ attachment to traditionally local private-law rules and
supports the ECJ’s judicial repression of national resistance to harmonization.142 The
further unification of European private law might seem only a natural extension of such
discrete initiatives. It is obvious, however, that the promulgation of a European civil
code would perform a symbolic function of much greater proportions.

iv. Transnational commerce: State-making through lex mercatoria and foreign
investment arbitration. - It is now time to switch the focus of these pages away from the
relatively homogeneous field of European law and to see how the state-making power of
private law can also be deployed in the broader context of transnational commerce.

141

See Schulze, A Century of the Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, supra __ (remarking that “[t]he national legal

character of the BGB was emphasized … by a decorative page in the German lawyers' journal [Deutsche
Juristen-Zeitung 1900, Nr.1] when the code came into force in the year 1900, entitled "One People, One
Reich, One Law."”)
142

On such resistance see Daniela Caruso, The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm

of European Legal Integration, 3 EUR. L.J. 3 (1997). For a recent discussion of French resistance to the
sweeping harmonization of products liability rules resulting from EC directives see Marie-Eve Arbour,
Compensation for Damage caused by Defective Drugs: European Private Law between Safety
requirements and Free Market Values, 10 EUR. L. J. 87 (2004).

52

Widely practiced in the Middle Ages, then buried for a long time under a
dominant Westphalian logic,143 lex mercatoria is again in vogue.144 The success of private
arbitration rests upon the intuition that when private parties deal with one another across
state borders, there are good reasons to depart from state-based rules or courts, and to
switch instead to private mechanisms for law making and dispute resolution.145
The new law merchant consists of rules and principles developed by arbitral
bodies (as opposed to national or international courts) in the context of national as well as
transnational disputes. Both the authority of the arbitrators and the applicability of the
norms they invoke depend on the mutual consent of private and/or public entities dealing
with one-another, often across national borders.146 Lex mercatoria is only binding in so
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far as the parties to a dispute have decided, when assuming reciprocal obligations, to be
subject to it. In other words, lex mercatoria finds its legitimacy in contract.147
Beyond such general remarks, one finds a wide array of opinions on the nature
and significance of substantive lex mercatoria. 148 Some authors deem it “an autonomous
legal order” based on “definite rules of law.”149 On the other end of the spectrum are the
jurists who emphasize the extremely scattered nature of the myriad transnational rules
applied by arbitrators, which fail to produce a “legal system” in any traditional, positivist
sense.150 In this minimalist version, lex mercatoria is simply a cluster of “international
trade usages sufficiently established to warrant that parties to international contracts –
whether generally or by category of contracts – be considered bound by them.”151 The
lawfulness of such usages does not depend on their enactment by any legislative body,
but rather on their good repute and recognition in given commercial communities.
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Arbitral awards are portrayed as non-systemic and orthogonal to supranational
authority.152
Interestingly, the more lex mercatoria is understood as a peculiarly disassembled
and soft version of private law, the more significant its State-making role is at a global
level. The apparently scattered and non-hierarchical nature of such rules makes them
appealing as quintessentially neutral, non-territorial, and indifferent to governmental
interests, and therefore suitable to produce objective and impartial adjudication in both
international and transnational contexts.153

Arbitration’s legitimacy thrives on the

deepening of the private/public divide in transnational legal discourse.154
Private arbitration by independent tribunals has slowly but surely acquired enough
dignity to qualify as an allegedly ideal way to solve not only merchants’ disputes, but
also serious questions of sovereignty, such as those involved in disputes between private
foreign investors and host states. This global trend is represented by over 2,000 bilateral
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At least according to the technical taxonomy proposed by Cesare Romano (Proliferation, supra __)

arbitration is the conceptual opposite of an international court or tribunal, because international courts aim
at hardening state commitments flowing from an international treaty, and set themselves necessarily above
state parties.
153

See CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER, supra note __, at 49 (discussing the liberalist myth that, at the end of

WWII, associated private international trade law with apolitical and neutral economic transactions, and
took the distinction between private and public international law as an article of faith.)
154

See Shalakany, supra __ at 455 ("Practitioners assume, in short, that arbitration is about the cooperative

coming together of equals to resolve contract law questions arising from disputes over property rights. This
conception of arbitration is firmly rooted in the tradition of opposing public and private spheres, and
imagining the latter as an apolitical, uncoercive space where people coordinate their economic interests
away from the threatening powers of the state.")
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investment treaties (BITs) and by several multilateral treaties.155 BITs grant investors
special treaty rights (most commonly the right to national, non-discriminatory and/or fair
and equitable treatment), in addition to whatever contractual rights, property or other
entitlements investors may obtain in the host states either through contracts with the
government156 or because of local constitutional protection of proprietary entitlements.157
In the absence of arbitration, investors’ rights or entitlements would be a matter for local
adjudication in pertinent state courts. But because a breach or any other fault of the host
state can also amount to a breach of treaty rights, investors’ claims may be ultimately
decided by arbitral tribunals.
Allowing foreign investment disputes to go to arbitration, rather than to the courts
of the host state, was a move intended to push aside governmental interests and politics,
and to protect investors’ rights through full and impartial justice. To this day, arbitration
scholars remind us of the bad old days in which private parties remained at the margins of
foreign investment disputes and could only invoke the diplomatic protection of their
governments. In that scenario, investor nations, by controlling the arbitral resolution of
state-to-state disputes, could obtain a systemic advantage over host countries. Equally
undesirable would be devolving such disputes to the national courts of the host country,
155

Most noticeably NAFTA and the Energy Charter Treaty. See Bernardo M. Cremades and David J.A.

Cairns, Contract and Treaty Claims and Choice of Forum in Foreign Investment Disputes, in NORBERT
HORN & STEFAN KRÖLL, ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES, 2004, 325, at 325-326.
156

The relations between governments and individual foreign investors are often governed by contracts.

This is regularly the case when foreign private firms are entrusted with the performance of services of
public interest – a common occurrence in the age of privatization. Host states may also provide investors
with constitutional rights or administrative safeguards. These types of investors’ claims may be enforced in
national courts. As it happens, national courts are generally more sympathetic than arbitrators to particular
socio-political circumstances that render State performance excessively onerous.
157

Cremades & Cairns, supra note __.

56

due to a more or less rational fear that biased judges would side with national interests.
Well-established arbitral bodies and a newly acquired culture of arbitral neutrality can
allegedly guarantee independence from (inter)governmental politics.158
To be sure, contrary to the practice of international commercial arbitration,
foreign investment tribunals are not officially in the business of applying private law.159
Scholars painstakingly explain that, even in the presence of ‘umbrella’ clauses,160 a treaty
violation cannot result simply from any breach of contract,161 and that the states’ conduct

158

Guillermo A. Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter

11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365 (2003).
159

See most clearly Thomas W. Wälde, The “Umbrella” (or Sanctity of Contract/Pacta sunt Servanda)

Clause in Investment Arbitration: A Comment on Original Intentions and recent Cases, 1:4
TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT (October 2004), footnote 79 and corresponding text (analogizing
direct investor-state arbitration to ‘vertical’ judicial review of administrative decisions in civil-law
countries – whereby “only the citizen has the right, not the state” – and contrasting it with international
commercial arbitration – which is rather horizontal and symmetrical.)
160

Many BITs contain so-called “umbrella clauses,” also known as “pacta sunt servanda” clauses. When

this is the case, at least certain obligations toward investors, as spelled out by contract or stemming from
host states’ laws, may deserve particularly strong enforcement, because the umbrella clause grants them
international status. See, with much detail and historical perspective, Wälde, The “Umbrella”Clause,
supra.
161

See Wälde, The “Umbrella”, supra,…p. 21. There is a significant trend among certain arbitrators to

equate the contractual breach of a State to a per-se violation of BITs obligations, especially in the presence
of an umbrella clause. See most recently SGS Societe Generale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the
Philippines,

ICSID

Case

No.

ARB/02/6

(Jan.

29,

2004),

available

at

http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/SGSvPhil-final.pdf, at para. 127 [...] In an important dictum, the
tribunal stated that even simple contract breaches by the host state may equal BIT violations when the
relevant BIT contains an umbrella clause. According to Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Authority and
International Investment Law, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 465, at 474 (2005), such dicta are in line with “The
trend in international law over the last half century […] to support investors and encourage investment by
weakening state power and authority.” The Tribunal concluded, however, that the relevant contract
between the parties reserved simple contract disputes to Philippines courts, and deferred to the will of the
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will have to be evaluated by investment arbitrators according to flexible standards (such
as fair treatment, non-discrimination, or fair compensation in case of takings.)162 In
principle, the system does not envisage any mechanistic enforcement of investors’ natural
rights.163 In at least two ways, however, private law lends legitimacy to foreign
investment arbitration.
First, deference to arbitral tribunals stems from governments’ express consent at
the time in which each investment treaty is stipulated, or if necessary at the time of the
dispute.164 Arbitral awards are legitimized by this private, contractual logic.
parties. Cf SGS-Pakistan, where the ICSID Tribunal refused to find, as a matter of principle, that any
simple breach of contract would also be a violation of the Swiss-Pakistani BIT’s umbrella clause.
162

Cremades & Cairnes, supra, at 339 (“[P]ublic international law has a prominent role in investment

arbitration.”)
163

Many arbitral awards in matters of foreign investment are characterized by a great degree of sensitivity

to context, and do not pursue the deterministic enforcement of contractual obligations. See, e.g., Waste
Management, Inc. v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3 para 114 (p. 40) (giving much weight to the
political difficulties encountered by Mexico in complying with its obligations towards the foreign investor,
and concluding that “NAFTA Chapter 11 is not a forum for the resolution of contractual disputes.” See also
Azinian et Al. v. Mexico, Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal. The
arbitrators rejected Claimants’ contention that “the City’s wrongful repudiation of the Concession Contract
violate[d] Articles 1110 (“Expropriation and compensation”) and 1105 (“Minimum Standard of
Treatment”) of NAFTA” (p. 20, para 75); “a foreign investor entitled in principle to protection under
NAFTA may enter into contractual relations with a public authority, and may suffer a breach by that
authority, and still not be in a position to state a claim under NAFTA.” (p. 23 para 83). To be sure, even
within these epistemic parameters, contract-based arguments continue to carry a heightened degree of
legitimacy and are utilized whenever possible to justify an arbitral finding. See Mondev International LTD
v. USA, Case No. ARB/(AF)/99/2 p. 47-48, par 134 (approving the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts for rejecting the contractual claim of a foreign investor not because of any “governmental
prerogative to violate investment contracts” – such a prerogative “would appear to be inconsistent with the
principles embodied in Article 1105 and with contemporary standards of national and international law
concerning governmental liability for contractual performance” – but because “normal principles of the
Massachusetts law of contracts” happened to excuse the City’s breach.)
164

See Wälde, The Umbrella Clause, supra __, and Cheng, supra, at 473.
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Secondly, arbitration performs the discursive function of leveling state interests
with investors’ individual rights along an imaginary horizontal line.165 The intuitive
analogy between investment arbitration and law-merchant tribunals, even though
incorrect,166 is rhetorically powerful. Disputes between host states and foreign investors,
rather than being treated as matters of sovereign governance, are now handled by private
arbitrators and, according to prevailing discourse, treated with the impartiality and
indifference to (inter)governmental politics typical of commercial arbitration.167
Claire Cutler has aptly highlighted the fil rouge connecting the rise of lex
mercatoria with the consolidation of new political bodies of transnational importance.
The trend towards soft regulation appears to be inconsistent with
the deepening of hard disciplines under the WTO and NAFTA …
However, notwithstanding such apparent discontinuities, it is crucial to
recognize that […t]he growing legitimacy of privatized lawmaking and
dispute resolution is strengthening the material, institutional and
ideological unity and hold of the mercatocracy.168

165

The case of Argentina is particularly significant. Many claims filed against Argentina and currently

pending before the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes were brought by private
companies in charge of the delivery of public services that were privatized during the 1990s. The economic
crisis of 2001 has made it impossible for Argentina to honor its contracts with such companies. See Carlos
E. Alfaro, Argentina: ICSID Arbitration and BITs Challenged by the Argentine Government, 21 December
2004 http://www.alfarolaw.com/ima/tapa/alfaro3.htm. The Federal Supreme Court of Argentina has
recently held that reasons of public policy, properly invoked in local courts, may supersede the deference to
arbitral awards mandated by BITs. Jose Cartellone Construcciones vs. Hidroelectrica Norpatagonica S.A.,
Causa J - 87, XXXVII R.O.
166

See Wälde, supra, fn 79 and corresponding text.
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Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers, at 408: “The spread of new dispute settlers … signifies, to many

international lawyers, the victory of the rule of law over diplomatic wrangling and the triumph of the
lawyers over the politicians […].”
168

CUTLER, supra __, at 31.
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Cutler’s reference to NAFTA is particularly significant. NAFTA is a relatively
recent project of economic integration between the three North American countries. It has
not brought about anything like the level of pooled sovereignty characterizing European
integration. On paper, it looks like an ordinary intergovernmental treaty, informed by a
Westphalian understanding of state sovereignty.169 But NAFTA resorts heavily to a
structured arbitration process, not only to resolve disputes between governments in such
public-law matters as anti-dumping duties,170 but also to adjudicate the individual rights
of private foreign investors. NAFTA has therefore embraced the logic of the many
bilateral investment treaties which now inhabit the land of global commerce.171

It is

generally understood that Chapter 11, relating to the protection of private investments in
any of the three sovereign parties, is where the real bite of NAFTA lies.172 Chapter 11
sends litigants off into the realm of private arbitration, and offers them a choice among
already existing arbitral structures.173 The dispersion of foreign investment disputes over
the most centripetal form of adjudication – the multitude of arbitral fora – is exactly what
169

In the US, in spite of highly vocal political opposition, NAFTA was approved through the fast-track

mechanism. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 143, 158 (1992).
170

NAFTA Chapter 19 (Antidumping and Countervailing Duty final determinations).

171

BITs seem to be too many to count. See Antonio Parra, ICSID and Bilateral Investment Treaties, 17

ICSID NEWS (2000) (giving an account of the world-wide proliferation of BITs in the past half-century,
and outlining their content.)
172

The implementation of Chapter 11 over the past few years has upset many. See Jeffrey Atik, NAFTA

Chapter 11: Repenser NAFTA Chapter 11: A Catalogue of Legitimacy Critiques, 3 ASPER REV. INT'L BUS.
& TRADE L. 215, 216 (“Chapter 11 attracted little attention during its negotiations. Indeed, it is now viewed
as having been something of a Trojan horse: seemingly unthreatening upon first delivery, but later
understood to have wrecked enormous damage to national democratic institutions.”)
173

ICSID, ICSID Additional Facility, and UNCITRAL. Atik, supra__, at 224. Governments have no say on

the composition of the arbitral panel or on the law arbitrators will apply.
See http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/about.htm
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turns an otherwise common international agreement into a veritable system with
profound constitutional implications.174 Decision-making moves away from traditional
state-based institutions and is entrusted to the non-ideological community of arbitrators,
through which pro-NAFTA forces can truly gain political ground.175 Rather than simply
eroding the sovereignty of the parties, NAFTA re-configures sovereignty at a different,
denationalized level.176 The shift is substantive. Heavily tangled bundles of items of
governance, not just narrow commercial disputes, are transferred to new adjudicatory
bodies.177
174

The contribution of private law discourse – with its emphasis on de-

See Afilalo, Constitutionalization through the Back Door, supra __. In order to adhere to NAFTA,

Mexico had to alter in controversial ways its constitutional provisions on property, and Canada had to
abandon its traditional tendency to limit foreign investment. See David Schneiderman, Investment Rules
and the New Constitutionalism, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 757 (2000).
175

This point requires a qualification. Wary of the risks of leaving the community of arbitrators unbridled,

NAFTA parties have devised mechanisms of political control. The Free Trade Commission, established
pursuant to NAFTA Article 2001, is composed of cabinet-level representatives of NAFTA parties or their
designees. One of its functions is the resolution of disputes concerning the interpretation and application of
NAFTA. (Article 2001(2)(c)). Article 1131(2) specifies that FTC interpretations shall be binding on arbitral
Tribunals. See Atick, supra, at 216 n.5 (2003), (noting that “the "interpretation" by the three NAFTA
Parties to cut back on Chapter 11's reach [NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of
Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (31 July 2001)] … has been described as a de facto amendment of Chapter
11.”
176

See Tai-Heng Cheng, Power, Authority, and International Investment Law, supra __ at 492 (arguing

that “The power and authority that international investment law drains from states does not evaporate, and
is often transferred to a wide range of decision makers […]. Among these transferees, the greatest
beneficiaries are foreign and international tribunals and investors.” )
177

Both scholars and civil society have criticized the use of arbitration in matters of foreign investment for

applying a crude private-law matrix to deeply political problems. Arbitrators are ill-equipped to take into
account the regulatory and social preoccupations of the host state. Domestic investors in a national court
would see their individual rights weighed against a number of policy considerations, and most importantly
against the government’s pursuit of the common good. See Wai, Transnational Liftoff, supra __ 263 (noting
that while “State-based private law often includes protection of third parties and social interests among its
substantive objectives, […] private adjudicators [may tend] to ignore arguments about the protection of
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politicization and triumph of the rule of law over state interests – is once more essential
to this development.

III. GLOBALIZATION AND PRE-POSITIVISM

1. Back to the future. - In continental Europe, the nineteenth-century codifications
established firm links between private law and national territorial jurisdiction. Since
then, private law has enjoyed positivist foundations.

Based on express legislative

enactments, private law in domestic fora needs no further source of legitimacy than the
codes or statutes in which it is enshrined. In the common-law world, property, contracts
and torts rules find their roots in a long line of judicial precedents, handed down by
courts endowed with territorial jurisdictions.
Private law, however, existed – either as a pluralist cluster of medieval laws, or as
a learned system of rules and doctrines – long before becoming part of state-making
agendas. Its pre-positive justifications changed over time, evolving from classical natural
law to modern rationalism, claiming roots alternatively in history or in the allegedly
scientific nature of its system.178
Private law now lives a life of its own outside the nation-state. It is invoked, as
we have observed, to justify momentous legal changes and to precipitate institutional
developments.

In this post-national dimension, private law arguments cannot claim

individuals and groups not party to the actual decision in their interpretation of these laws. This may result
from a form of "democracy deficit" in denationalized legal regimes.”)
178

Joerges, The Science of Private Law, supra note __, at 47.
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positivist grounding.

It is not surprising, therefore, that pre-positive justifications

resurface again, out of context and oftentimes in random combinations, to lend privatelaw arguments the necessary persuasive authority. It is to these justifications – the
absolute force of individual rights, the sacredness of promises, the essential coherence of
private law systems, and the distributive neutrality of private-law adjudication – that we
shall now turn.

ii. Natural rights as trumps. - Beyond state confines, the logic and even the
lexicon of private law discourse are strikingly reminiscent of pre-modern times. Where
centralized ‘public’ authorities are in scarce supply, cross-border transactions between
individual or corporate entities do not seem to partake of the logic of states’ government.
In a global context, private law is often described as utterly indifferent to regulatory and
political designs. Private law rhetoric exalts grass-roots norm production as independent
from and indifferent to sovereign state powers.179 Its sources – from local merchant
communities to global digital networks – are kept emphatically separate from national
law-making institutions. The emphasis is on discrete, disaggregated, private loci of law
production, which can compete with – and even undermine – state-based regulatory
processes, but can never really be forms of state sovereignty in any traditional sense.
This non-systemic, pre-positive strand of private law discourse finds its origin in
17th-century natural law.180 According to this philosophical school, human reason and

179
180

See di Robilant, supra __.
Grotius is commonly associated with the start of the modern school of jus-naturalism. His work

established the coincidence between the tenets of law –based on moral and theological grounds – and the
common dictates of conscience to be determined by the logical workings of human reason. Pufendorf – a
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nature itself were the ultimate sources of law. Law was therefore independent of, and
superior to, the dictates of national legislators. Jus-naturalism identified a number of
foundational private law concepts, including the idea that individuals are endowed with
inalienable rights, with no regard, and if necessary in contrast, to the sovereign laws of
the time.181
The unmediated, absolute force of natural rights is clearly at work in
contemporary private law arguments deployed in non-national settings. While state-based
property and liability rules are constrained by overarching constitutional frames,182 the
kind of private law invoked by trans-national actors seems disentangled from such limits.
For instance, the EU doctrine of state liability –whereby a breach of Community law
must lead to full and effective individual remedies in national courts—stretches
significantly the limits of tort law as understood within the member states.183 The
constitutional development brought about by this doctrine has often found its rhetorical
justification in a superior, apolitical, pre-positivist understanding of individual
entitlements, based on the jus-naturalist axiom “ubi jus ibi remedium.” 184

second-generation modern jus-naturalist – refined and further secularized the rationalism of Grotius’s
philosophy. WIEACKER, supra note __ , 213-214
181

Grotius’s work was in fact a reaction to sovereigns’ political misjudgment during the 30 years war. See

Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr, The Grotian Vision of World Order, 76 AM J. INT’L L. 477, 480 (1982).
182

See e.g. Italian Civil Code 832, defining property rights as a set of prerogatives of ownership duly

identified and limited by (statutory) law.
183

Daniel J. Meltzer, Member state liability in Europe and the United States, 4 INT’L J CONST. L. 39

(2006).
184

Walter Van Gerven, Harmonization of Private Law: Do we need it?, 41 C.M.L.Rev. 505, 517-518

(2004) (noting that the general principles of non-contractual liability of the member states certainly would
not support the logic that a court can demand payment of damages from the state when the state’s fault is in
legislating.)
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A similar theme runs through the Loizidou case. The protection of individual
ownership from state interference is a classic function of international law grounded upon
John Locke’s conceptualization of property as a pre-political, natural institution based on
the labor of man.185 This core concept must notoriously come to terms with its antithesis
- namely, Jeremy Bentham’s notion of property as a creature of the state.186 But insofar as
state reasons can be kept out of the picture, and the conflict reduced to a seemingly
horizontal dispute, jus-natural axioms can carry the day.

Thanks to the clever

argumentation of the Loizidou court, natural law justifications could play out in a privatelaw contest, lending extraordinary strength to the petitioner’s claim.
By the same token, in transnational contexts, individual rights are invoked as
trump cards187 and boosted by sheer jusnatural rhetoric. As the state effaces, natural law
triumphs. Private autonomy can express itself without the clutter of state intervention.
Prominent arbitration scholars explain:

“[I]n the field of transnational business activities […] the force of the contractual
consensus can flourish and develop its law-making quality, unhampered by
185

J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 27, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 283 (P.

LASLETT ed. 1970). See L. Benjamin Ederington, Property as a Natural Institution: The Separation of
Property from Sovereignty in International Law, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 263, 266-67 (1997). Several
international law instruments embody this idea. See Id. at 323, on the Hague and Geneva Conventions.
186

Ederington, supra __ at 270-274. Bentham’s notion is also well established in modern international law.

In this positivist dimension, private property is subject to re-definition depending on the outcome of interstate conflicts. When this view prevails, the claims of individual property owners against occupying forces
meet with no success whatsoever.
187

Joel P. Trachtman and Philip M. Moremen, Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute

Settlement: Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221 (2003) (criticizing the use of rights
rhetoric to promote the direct effect of WTO, i.e. the possibility for individuals to sue states in breach of
WTO rulings.)
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consumer protection laws and notions of distributive justice that go beyond the
general principle of ‘good faith and fair dealing in international trade.’”188
Given its conceptual simplicity and historical pedigree, this paradigm aspires to
providing the purest, truest form of private-law justice, and to prompting institutional
changes of the sort exemplified above.

iii. State-making and state-breaking in “Pacta sunt Servanda.” - The jusnatural
maxim pacta sunt servanda, featuring prominently to this day in both private and
international law,189 is based on morals and reason. Natural law precedes the birth of the
state and assumes that consent is binding by nature even in the absence of coercive
authorities. Each individual’s act of contractual autonomy can generate rules which he
will be expected to follow not because of any sovereign command, but because he
consented to them.190 As observed above, this logic holds sway in contemporary legal
discourse. It carries with it profound state-breaking implications, in so far as it shifts the

188

Klaus Peter Berger, Transnational Commercial Law in the Age of Globalization, supra __ p. 11.

189

Richard Hyland, Pacta Sunt Servanda: A Meditation, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 405 (1994) explains that the

origins of the formula “pacta sunt servanda” are to be found in the work of Pufendorf (who extrapolated it
from Digest materials) and Grotius. The concept of private autonomy and enforceability of nuda pacta was
born in the context of lex mercatoria.
190

Individual autonomy, a fundamental tenet of classical private law, was a central pillar in Immanuel

Kant's philosophy, where it defined the very foundations of justice. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE
METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 34 (John Ladd trans., 1965) (1797) ("Justice is … the aggregate of
those conditions under which the will of one person can be conjoined with the will of another in accordance
with a universal law of freedom.")
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locus of law production away from central authorities and down to the level of consent
between equally situated subjects. 191
Public international law is conventionally based on a jus-naturalist faith in private
autonomy. Sovereign governments, understood as glorified individuals, can willingly
enter treaties and bind themselves to spontaneously undertaken obligations.192 This basic
contractual paradigm operates in a loose, disaggregated legal order, with no world
legislator or court with real bite. The proverbial softness of classical international law is
based on the impossibility to enforce, in any judicial sense, the obligations spelled out in
treaties.193 In so far as private law inspires or governs bi- or multilateral treaties, it

191

See Kenneth R. Davis, When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards,

45 BUFFALO L. REV. 49, 130 (1997) remarking that "Arbitration agreements … diminish the reach of
government to supervise and control dispute resolution through the process of in-court adjudication. By
carving out spheres of "private government," parties establish their own tribunal, and shape their own
decisionmaking process. They do not appear in court and thus do not participate in the state's legal
institution. Rather than following the directions of a judge, a state official, they entrust the dispute to
private citizens, the arbitrators of their choice." (Footnotes omitted.)
192

Murphy, supra note __, at 483 (attributing to Grotius the postulate of identity of States and individuals).

Treaties are quintessentially contractual. The Vienna Convention on the interpretation of Treaties mirrors
civil code provisions governing the construction of contract clauses. Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340. On the analogy between international treaties and
contracts, and on the limits of this analogy, see Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis
of International Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1999).
193

The story of the International Court of Justice is rich in episodes that prove the difficulty of enforcing

agreements against signatory governments whenever such governments decide to renege on their
commitments. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4 (June 27). If compliance
is not technically mandatory, it may result anyway from utilitarian calculus. Complying with Treaties may
enhance a nation’s wealth of states by yielding peace, favoring foreign investment, or increasing the chance
of obtaining financial or political credit. See Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a
Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1941 (2002) (observing that countries may be “rewarded for positions
rather than effects - as they are when monitoring and enforcement of treaties are minimal and external
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simply emphasizes the autonomy of nations, and does not yield state-like models of
enforcement on the international plane.
On the other hand, the binding force of consent is at the core of the will theory, on
which the whole modern system of private law was allegedly built.194 Sovereigns may be
entrusted with the mission of making sure that their subjects’ private autonomy be
allowed to thrive in practice. The apparatus of the state does not replace consent as a
source of private law, but provides consent with the enforcement tools necessary to its
establishment as binding law. In the past, this logic has often invested the state with a
monopoly over the adjudication of private disputes, along the lines of central tenets and
values that are endorsed by its courts throughout its territory. Today, the same logic
supports the creation of centralized coercive authorities, and can lend legitimacy to new
post-national institutions. The celebration of consent as the only legitimate source of
obligations in a post-national age can justify the emergence of new authorities, endowed
with the allegedly neutral and merely procedural role of channeling and reinforcing the
human practice of consensual dealing. As observed in the foregoing pages, this recurrent
pattern of institutional development in the age of globalization is facilitated by the
rhetorical ambiguity of the jus-natural sacredness of consent.

iv. Centripetal patterns: from dispersion to system. – The private law envisaged
by the designers of transnational architectures often starts as dispersed and refractory to

pressure to conform to treaty norms is high.”) But the very relevance of utilitarian motives in the decision
to abide by treaties proves their essentially non-binding nature.
194

Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s

"Consideration and Form", 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94 (2000).
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centralized control. The smallest unit of transnational commerce is the discrete business
relation between two parties situated in different legal regimes. If this relation generates
disputes, they will most often be settled, or lead to arbitral awards characterized by
secrecy and therefore oblivion. With the quantitatively thin exception of those arbitral
awards that parties choose to challenge in court, all disputes will remain as private and
beyond state reach as inter-spousal quarrels.
History tells, however, that in matters of private law, individual cells tend to
coalesce into full-blown organisms. The endemic aspiration to coherence, typical of
private law in any of its manifestations, will eventually lead law-making bodies to
consolidate ‘efficient’ and ‘desirable’ products of private ingenuity into

‘codes’ or

systems of a kind. First, if an individual contractual device is successful, it will spread
out to become a common business practice.195 Lawyers will promote the same business
scheme to further clients, and these will in turn apply what they have learned in their new
business ventures.

Then, in the name of certainty, predictability, transparency etc.,

someone will skillfully close all loopholes and iron all seams.
Private law’s aspiration to coherence generally manifests itself in either of two
ways. Private law may coalesce into a code that will reflect the values of a legal system,
as identified and defined by an enlightened legislator. Even though the drafting of such
codes depends on time-honored accretions of practical wisdom and fancy juridical work,

195

See e.g. Stephen Zamora, NAFTA and the Harmonization of Domestic Legal Systems: The Side Effects

of Free Trade, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 401, 421 (1995) (describing the diffusion of franchising in
Mexico as the “creation of a new jus commune through the design of legal models generated by private
business.” Zamora attributes the jus-commune analogy to Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of American
Law in Europe, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 236-46 (1991).
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they are meant as top-down mandates channeling private transactions through one welldefined and desirable course.
The other path to coherence is a patient systemization of existing norms
developed over time by grass-root legal work, based on the belief that the spontaneity of
human interaction and the wisdom of piece-meal adjudication will lead to both
reasonable and efficient sets of rules.196 This model is traditionally associated with the
common law and exemplified to this day by the U.S. culture of restatements. The
emphasis on rationalization is as strong here as in the code model197 and will at times
require adjustments or reformulations of certain rules as developed at grass-root level.198
Coherence is a diffuse preoccupation among common law jurists, and despite the demise
of classical formalism, the rationality of the system is still of paramount importance.199
On a global scale, the latter model is clearly in control.200 The codification of
transnational private law, in the rhetoric of its promoters, is portrayed as a marginally
refined and slightly edited version of whatever the base (of practicing lawyers, arbitrators
196
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and business actors) has produced. Scholars are paying increasing attention to the
dynamics of bottom-up norm production, both within national contexts201 and on a
transnational scale.202 Even in the ‘soft’ realm of lex mercatoria, we can observe ongoing
phenomena of systemization. Such efforts aim at closing exit points, guaranteeing
predictability, and therefore enhancing the trust of private parties in arbitral
adjudication.203 International scholars from many different quarters are now pleading for
some sort of rationalization of lex mercatoria.204 They attribute the need for uniformity
to a broader concern for the overall reliability of arbitration as a dispute-resolution
mechanism. Because of the inconsistency and low predictability of arbitration outcomes
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– the argument goes – practitioners regrettably continue to prefer national laws or
traditional conflict-of-law rules to lex mercatoria.205 This problem could be cured by
harmonizing arbitration’s procedural rules.206 But because “[s]ubstantive law is often
born in the womb of procedure,”207 uniformity of substance is bound to follow suit.208
Ongoing projects of global codification are aimed at bringing transnational law into a
system characterized by both coherence and closure.209
Such not-so-soft versions of codification help boost the role of arbitral fora as
neutral and utterly non-political bodies, which in turn can serve the goal of new regional
projects such as NAFTA. Scholars denounce the inconsistency of arbitral decisions in
matters of foreign investment, and argue that the harmonization of private awards is
essential to the legitimacy of foreign investment treaties. Recurrent terms in this type of
arguments are “legitimacy, transparency, determinacy, and coherence.”210 In typical
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private-law progression, a body of law originally built upon dispersion and spontaneity
ends up depending on the harmony and coherence of its substantive rules.211
As noted above, the ongoing scholarly elaboration of a European civil code
partakes of this systemic logic.

In the face of a number of topical private-law

interventions of EU legislators, implemented by means of discrete directives, many
scholars vouch for a return to system and coherence (in the spirit of Pandectism), or for a
common code that would correct the historical accident of national particularities (as the
Code Napoleon replaced pre-extant legal Babels).212 The basis of such attitudes is not
necessarily a political dream of European federalism, but rather a scholarly understanding
of the proper role and design of private law.213
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v. The rhetoric of neutrality. – The illustrations in Part II have highlighted private
law’s ‘ordering’ function, namely, its ability to generate apparently coherent systems,
seemingly firm boundaries between law and politics, and ostensibly strong versions of
“the rule of law.” The appeal of private law discourse in many fora lies in its apparent
distance from ideological contestation. Private law arguments seem apt to move
passionate debates onto an abstract plane where only ‘neutral’ policies – such as
efficiency, protection of reliance, or predictability – will be invoked.214 In its postnational dimension, private law is all too often portrayed in the most classical of fashions:
horizontal and dispersed, or self-contained and systemic, but usually orthogonal to
distributive considerations. The power of this discourse and the role of its line-drawing
rhetoric in the legitimization of new forms of sovereignty are remarkable.
These pages have kept a critical distance from this kind of private-law discourse,
mostly due to its striking indifference to the factual and conceptual complexity of privatelaw adjudication.

Obviously, the Pandectist architecture is no longer extant. Post-

classical private law is characterized by “its linkages with regulatory and distributive
policies and its opening to social values and human rights.”215 “Linkages” and
“openings” disrupt the close, self-referential nature of classical private law.216 This is
true not only in national systems, but wherever private law attempts to reassert its
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logic.217

The arbitrators entrusted with the task of adjudicating foreign investment

disputes know perfectly well how difficult it is to tell the difference between a city’s
breach of contract and an expropriation in the public interest, or how deeply a stategranted immunity can redefine the contours of interference with contractual relations. 218
In the EU, the regulatory and redistributive function of private law rules is emerging
starkly as the process of integration forces national legislators to rethink, rationalize and
change their civil codes.219 The Strasbourg Court must also work its way through a
quagmire of political complexities before it can isolate pure property issues in the
Loizidou case.
On a global scale, just as within the borders of national legal communities,
classical partitions slowly evaporate, and the unavoidable overlap of private and public
categories occurs again within the newly created systems. But when that happens, it is too
late to call into question the very existence of new sovereign entities.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: LOOKING BEYOND DISPERSION AND NEUTRALITY
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The ‘State-making’ role of private law in the age of globalization begs careful
analysis. Outside the nation state, private law is moving along the same stages of
development that it has experienced within state borders for over two centuries –
codification into orderly systems, contribution to state-making projects, and eventual
enmeshment with policy and ideology. In many different contexts, private law stands for
much more than the disaggregated resolution of transnational private disputes. In full
blown classical logic, the alleged coherence and purity of private law discourse is
invoked to identify and or/reinforce emerging supra-national authorities, in a fashion
oddly resembling European codifications and evoking the birth of the nation state. Most
remarkably, post-classical complexities are kept out of the picture.

Private law is

deployed as the powerful line-drawing instrument it once was – a symbol of neutrality
and indifference to power and ideology, and therefore an invaluable source of legitimacy
for nascent post-national institutions.
Focusing on the ‘State-making’ side of the private-law coin, I have intentionally
departed from a prominent trend in contemporary legal scholarship that only focuses on
private law’s spontaneity, disaggregated patterns, and bottom-up normativity.

This

literature assumes as a given the dismemberment of the bundle of sovereignty into a
million disjointed sticks. The divide between spontaneity and order, however, is thin and
elusive. Wherever parallel conduct gels into visible, predictable normative patterns,
private law reproduces its complex and unbreakable relation with traditional forms of
sovereignty. Each private-law microcosm breeds – or foresees the reproduction of –
usual clusters of regulatory functions and political implications, ready to feed into new
institution-building agendas. Post-national governance is not only an emerging network
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of discrete knots,220 nor just a pond where each stone makes ripples.221 It is also a place
where the wheel of state sovereignty gets reinvented at new levels, often with old tools
and evergreen rhetorical devices.
Throughout this article, I have aimed at showing the flip-side of the rhetoric of
dispersion. A second focus of these pages has been the extraordinarily powerful rhetoric
of neutrality characterizing private law discourse in a global context. A paradox has
emerged: on one hand, private law provides globally a mode of legal argumentation that
is most abstract from ideologies of distribution and most distant from questions of
centralized sovereignty. On the other hand, due to its very rhetoric of neutrality and
dispersion, private law discourse happens to accelerate the formation of highly political
global institutions.
This use of private law discourse escapes, per se, normative evaluations. Private
law is a form of language, as it were, and there is nothing either good or bad in any given
language or expressive tool – it all depends on what it is used for.222 As a matter of fact,
the rhetorical move of switching to private law categories can offer a refreshing break220
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through in case of ideological gridlock. Tilting the table when the ball is stuck may
happen to be the only way forward in a pinball game. What matters is to realize that
recasting a dispute in private law terms is a plausible move within a game which is and
remains both legal and political, not an escape onto a parallel universe where pure ruleof-law criteria can solve all conflicts. At the end of the day, in each of the illustrations of
Part II above, private law arguments produce irreversible institutional change and
profound power shifts. The rhetoric of abstraction is not a vehicle of distributive
neutrality.
By contrast, in the foregoing pages we have repeatedly observed the practice of
borrowing syllogistic strength from private law doctrines in order to portray institutional
and ultimately political developments as a matter of legal necessity. A switch to private
law jargon is certainly no solution to the many normative problems posed by postnational sovereignty. In no way can private rights discourse, for instance, provide
unequivocal answers to such diverse questions as whether to expand private rights of
actions against states when they fail to comply with international trade obligations,223 or
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whether to increase the viability of cross-border class actions to redress mass torts.224
Such choices can only be based on context-sensitive empirical analysis and on an
appreciation of the distributive implications of each plausible strategy in context.225
Shifting from a loose level of coordination between regulatory sources to a level of firmly
legal hierarchies – State-making, as I have termed the process in these pages – may
happen to be, in context, a commendable form of institutional restructuring. But the use
of private law rhetoric to portray State-making as technically necessitated unduly stifles
political debate, and may mask profound redistributive implications.226 Ultimately, this
essay is a plea for more dialogue and political confrontation in and around the institutions
of globalization.
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